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ABSTRACT

National and international research on governmental privatization efforts reflects
myriad successes and failures. However, little is known about the effectiveness of family
safety privatization efforts in the state of Florida. In Brevard County, Florida, family
safety privatization efforts have been underway for several years now, and while
evaluations are taking place, they do not reflect one key piece of information—the
perceptions of family safety workers. A snowball sample was obtained from former and
current child safety workers and open- and closed-ended questions were administered
with a total of 15 former and current family safety workers who work or worked for
several different public and private family safety agencies within Brevard County,
Florida. Information was obtained regarding perceptions of privatization to adequately
and more efficiently do the work of public entities. The results show two primary areas
of interest. The model of care which has been instituted post-privatization (CARES) has
been perceived as more effective than the former state model; the strongest
problematic themes that developed concerned power, control, and the perception of
unfairness. These themes are explored using a backwards mapping approach and
recommendations for continued growth and cohesion are explored.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

A caretaker for Rilya Wilson, the foster child whose disappearance four
years ago exposed serious flaws in Florida's child-welfare system, was indicted
Wednesday on charges of murdering the girl, who was 4 years old when she
vanished. The [FDCF] has said it failed to notice Rilya's disappearance for 15
months because a caseworker lied about visiting her home… Rilya's body has
never been found.
—The New York Times, March 17, 2005

Many ways exist in which to think about and assign responsibility for the issues
that surround the welfare of children. In particular, state-run agencies which have been
charged with keeping children safe have been criticized as inflexible, categorical,
cumbersome and costly. Due partly to perceptions of state agency ineffectiveness
community based care (CBC) agencies have been identified as the new model of
program effectiveness with regard to child safety. It is hoped that CBC agencies in
Florida will not only meet the parameters of federal and state laws, but also provide
flexible, comprehensive services at the local level—services which can be better
managed and delivered to achieve enhanced outcomes for vulnerable children (CBC
Final Report 2001:1-3).
With respect to budget concerns, the area of family safety has long been
problematic for the Florida Department of Children and Families (FDCF) to effectively
administer. Due to the nature of the work of ameliorating issues of family safety, the
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State of Florida budget in this area has been steadily increasing, often far surpassing
allotments. The 2008-09 State budget for family safety programs was approximately $1
billion dollars, with nearly a third of that funding going directly toward “child protection
and permanency” (The People’s Budget Services List). In child protection circles, the
goal is to achieve permanency of placement in the most appropriate setting for the child
in the shortest amount of time which is reasonable and safe. Although it is not standard,
many child protection cases can take months, if not years to wind through the system.
The seed for one method of controlling this budget—privatization—was planted
by State law several years ago. For myriad social, political, and economic reasons,
placing the responsibility of child safety in the hands of private agencies is an appealing
notion for state politicians and budget planners, as it could be one form of controlling the
ever-increasing expenditures of the FDCF while serving to refocus the spotlight of
difficult (and mishandled) child abuse cases away from the government and onto private
entities.
The purpose of this research is to examine the efficacy and efficiency of the
privatization of some of the major child safety initiatives within Brevard County, Florida.
How effective has the implementation of private agency child safety programs been?
What are the drawbacks and benefits to this system of care as opposed to that of the
prior public agency program administration? Using one-on-one interviews I examine the
perceptions of child safety workers who have worked under both systems of care. I use
a variety of qualitative techniques, primarily semi-structured interviews with closed- and
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open-ended questions. Interactionist theory is used to examine micro level concerns,
and feminist theory assists me in examining some macro level issues. My research also
relies upon the work of Dorothy Smith, specifically, her use of “Standpoint” as a
methodological framework lending reflexivity and fluidity to the interview process.
I use a backward mapping methodological approach, which rests on the premise
that “policymakers have a strong interest in affecting the implementation process and
the outcomes of policy decisions” (Elmore 1979-1980: 604). Using backward mapping, I
start my research at the lowest level to examine the specific behaviors and beliefs of
workers at the field level and those who are at the lower end of the administrative
hierarchy, continuing my analysis in an upward structural direction in order to answer
my primary research question: is this system of care working?
Caseworker/family safety worker assessments and opinions of pre- and postprivatization efforts shed light on the effectiveness of the new systems and procedures.
I believe their commentary attests to the ability of private agencies, which deal directly
with one of our most vulnerable populations, to do the work of public programs. A
thorough “before and after” picture is essential, and program changes must be fully
explored, not only for their motivations, but also for their impacts as they have been
implemented.
Because many of the current Brevard County family safety workers are veterans
of the FDCF, their perceptions of private program effectiveness as compared to their
experiences with the FDCF are relevant. Often changes in systems are analyzed at an

3

administrative level with an examination of aggregated data from a “top-down”
perspective, which ignores the perceptions and concerns of field-level workers (Elmore
1979-1980). Thus, backward mapping helps to “close the loop” by providing additional
relevant information as to the day-to-day issues that may arise among workers who
have firsthand experience with implementing agency mandates.
One small study conducted by Withorn (1999; 2000) did explore changes in
welfare systems post-privatization by using human services caseworkers and
administrator interviews, and I utilize it as a frame to help conceptualize my research. At
times Withorn clearly opposes the idea of privatization, while at other times, she makes
the assertion that the problem is not with privatization; rather, she asserts, problematic
changes to social service systems that began with the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) have had the most devastating and
dramatic impact on how caseworkers do their jobs. Her argument is that regardless of
the system in place, welfare reforms have posed the most significant barrier to
caseworker success. The implication that Withorn makes is that there may not be room
for successes in the myriad private programs due to the restrictions imposed by
PRWORA—the restrictive “reforms” of PRWORA may work to influence failure rather
than success.
Withorn’s research method is somewhat similar to mine and her foundations and
observations are important to my approach. The differences, however, are significant.
Withorn interviewed 40 people in 2001, when privatization fears were sweeping through
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the family services community nationwide. Her sample was drawn from caseworkers
and administrators from around the country (her criteria for inclusion in her sample is
unclear). She acknowledges that her work is a work in progress, and defines her essay
as speculative rather than as a presentation of findings (2001). Having collected data
from a sample of 40 participants at the national level and across myriad agencies, she
is not in a position to make any clear statements about any one agency, individual
efforts to privatize, or successes and failures of local models. This is a drawback that I
avoid by collecting data from all available workers in one geographic location. An indepth analysis of one model of care sheds light on what works and what does not work
in one local community and is a starting point for future comparative analysis. This is an
important place to start the analysis with regard to program and worker effectiveness
and with respect to the ability of the front lines to apply top-level mandates and
directives.
Withorn comes to several conclusions in her research. She expresses each of
these conclusions as “worries (112), and outlines seven key worries: lack of federal
oversight, growth of new providers, shifts in the focus of family safety, changes in
conditions for poor families, job worries, and the roles of religion within the social
service community.
One most relevant caveat which separates the work of Withorn from my work is
the focus of the research. While Withorn seems to have centered her research on
welfare workers (who fall to the broader general category of “children and families”
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caseworkers) my work will concentrate specifically on family safety workers. While both
pools of workers are drawn from the same general areas of work, the differences are
significant. Welfare workers have a primary focus on getting their clients to work. Family
safety workers have a primary focus on the welfare, well-being and safety of children.
There are overlaps in the jobs: often a welfare worker might find that there is neglect
going on in a household, and likewise, often a family safety worker will have to help
stabilize a home by assisting a parent with finding a job or with locating job training.
These job classifications are at once intimately linked and clearly separate.
In addition to interview data, I have collected general information such as
caseloads before and after transition, differences (and similarities) in types of cases
considered for program inclusion, exclusion, or other specific intervention, and job
satisfaction issues. My research explores issues related to whether private agencies are
able to better control and allocate their expenditures at a local level and whether their
presence has benefitted not only vulnerable children in Brevard County, but has also
served to reduce cost overruns and State budgetary concerns. My findings will be used
to generalize to macro level issues related to the picture of family safety—primarily, the
background for evaluating State agencies that privatize.
The last purpose and main goal of this dissertation is to be practical. I have
uncovered information which can be helpful to local agencies with respect to the work
they do with vulnerable children and families.
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CHAPTER TWO: LIERATURE REVIEW

Examining Welfare Trends: Welfare Policy since the 1970s

Nixon spoke of a “Family Assistance Program” to help guarantee an income to
working parents as far back as 1969 (Jencks 1992). Of course, this program never
came to fruition. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) ensured a minimum income for
elderly people in the United States, however there was still no guarantee of a minimum
income for working parents (Beland and Hacker 2004). However, some programs
moved toward the concept of guaranteed income: Medicaid, the Food Stamp program
and Section 8 subsidized housing were a few. While these are not income transfer
programs, they can help to level the playing field for lower income adults and children
by supplementing the family income with “vouchers” for services, freeing up the family’s
income for other living expenses and emergences. The unfavorable effect of these
programs was to create a partial safety net on which government spending was at an all
time high with regard to social welfare policies (Jencks 1992), while only minimally
helping the poor. Nixon’s FAP attempted to eliminate this bureaucratic heaviness by
orchestrating direct cash payments to the working poor and those without jobs who lived
in poverty. The program was overwhelmingly disliked by all concerned, regardless of
political leanings, and just before his 1972 re-election, Nixon allowed the program to
expire.
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In support of Jencks assertion, look at the current Section 8 housing program in
Brevard County which has a waiting list of over 640 families (Section 8 Outreach). How
did this happen? By the late 1940s, most players involved in social welfare came to a
“general vision for housing as providing a ‘decent home and a suitable living
environment’ for all American families” (Guthrie and McQuarrie n.d.:7). For the thirty
years that followed the implementation of the Housing Act of 1945, federal funds were
the integral component of programs to build low-income housing.
However, by the 1980s, federal programs virtually disappeared when the federal
government extricated itself from the Section 8 New Construction program and moved
toward allowing corporations tax-credits to build low-income housing. We could argue
that this was a definite shift toward privatization. One of the increasingly problematic
dysfunctions of this shift has been to allocate more and more federal dollars toward
satisfying mortgage payments to private corporations which have invested in the lowincome housing market while practically halting the building of new public low-income
houses (Guthrie and McQuarrie n.d:8-9). Coupled with this trend is the movement
toward “mixed-income communities” which are geared toward households which have
incomes which are higher than most current housing residents can afford (Vale 2002:34). These trends are apparent at the local level, where the list for subsidized housing is
so deep in Brevard County that it is common to have month long periods of time where
no applications are being accepted.
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In 1902, Jane Addams conducted groundbreaking research into the housing
conditions of the poor in Chicago, and she uncovered that a considerable amount of
political and social apathy surrounded the tenuous circumstances of housing for the
poor. According to Addams, “this apathy can only be explained on one of two grounds,
either that we do not know the housing conditions which exist, or that we are so selfish
as to have no sense of responsibility in regard to them” (Addams1902:103).
Child care services in Brevard County illustrate a similar problem:
[T]he Coalition had a waiting list of 255 children for School Readiness
services [school readiness services are child care arrangements for pre-K
children which are often utilized by lower-income working parents as a means to
have adequate care arrangements so that they can meet requirements for
welfare]. As of September 20, 2007 this number had grown to 620. It is important
to note, this number is never a true reflection of the need for School Readiness
services. When a waiting list is in place, many families do not inquire about
services (FY 06.07 Annual Report of the Early Learning Coalition of Brevard 10).
This means that on the surface we can point to the existence of social services to
assist the poor, but that the actual success of these programs to assist adequate
numbers of the poor in moving up the social ladder over time is questionable. The
problem is not one of quality; rather it is a problem of inadequate quantity of services to
meet the needs of the community.
This inability to move up the socio-economic ladder coupled with growing social
inequality serves two purposes. First, when inequality increases “extreme incomes,
occupations, and amounts of wealth (high and low) become more prevalent and fewer
people occupy the middle of the distribution (Beller and Hout 2006:21). Second, “the

9

probability that someone who starts life in extreme privilege will stay there…
(simultaneously) increases the probability that someone whose parents were poor will
also be poor” (Beller and Hout 2006:21).
The apparent economically limited and short term repercussions of these
programs adds to the debate about exactly how to best assist the poor and helps to
cement inaccurate and devastating attitudes and stereotypes about the poor in the
minds of many Americans. An undercurrent runs through much of the discourse about
welfare in the United States leading many to believe that children who grow up
“dependent on welfare are… more likely to adopt this lifestyle themselves, thus
perpetuating the cycle of poverty” (Reintsma 2007:2). This stereotype of the poor is
what eventually led to the crafting of welfare reforms in the late 1980s and the early
1990s.
During the Reagan presidency, ideas about welfare services in the US began to
radically swing toward a “new” notion about what it meant to be “on welfare” (Marwell
2004). Taking over the Whitehouse from Jimmy Carter, who faced increasing
disapproval from the public toward the end of his term, Reagan was able to bring his
“new” ideology about the welfare state to the American public. Reagan’s argument that
“public assistance should only be given to the ‘truly needy’” (Hudson and Coukos
2005:7) was a success, and, while the distinction goes back for centuries, the public
again began to categorize the poor as “deserving” and “undeserving” (Hudson and
Coukos 2005:11). Further, Reagan was able to mount “an assault on welfare

10

dependency itself as the root cause of many problems of the poor” and “welfare
dependency was blamed as a source of moral and socioeconomic pathology” (Corcoran
et al., 2000:243-4). By subtly assigning poverty to the category of “perversity,” Reagan
was able to create a change mechanism for how the public viewed poverty’s
relationship to the administration of welfare policy and was further able to craft policies
which placed the responsibility (and causes) for poverty on individual behaviors and
shortcomings rather than on the failings of our economic and political systems.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
Perhaps one of the most sweeping social policy changes of recent years was
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),
passed in 1996 by President Bill Clinton. This reform is often viewed as a “watershed
moment in the restructuring of the US welfare system” (Morgen and Maskovsky
2003:315-6). In response to historically high welfare caseloads in the early 1990’s
(Ribar 2005; Corcoran et al., 2000), there were significant provisions to the PRWORA,
including giving individual states more power and authority over how they distributed
funds as well as over how they decided eligibility for programs (Dias and MaynardMoody 2006). The PRWORA was supposed to “end welfare as we know it” (Ribar
2005:514). Along with this decrease in federal authority to design and administer funds
(now called TANF funds for Temporary Aid to Needy Families), recipients were required
to either work or be in work preparation programs. States were also incentivized to
reduce out-of-wedlock births. Finally a five year limit was set for recipients of TANF
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funds, and while it was a very small number of people, the first welfare recipients who
reached that five-year mark did so in 2002 (Hill 2005; Grogger 2004; Grogger and
Michalopoulos 2003; Blank 2002). Concentrating on the effects of welfare reform:
The most recent wave of welfare reform began in 1992 when the
Department of Health and Human Services started approving state “waivers” that
gave welfare recipients more incentives to seek work… During this period
Congress also expanded the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), strengthened
child support enforcement, and made more money available to states for
subsidized childcare and health care. These changes in social policy were
followed by a dramatic decline in the number of families receiving cash welfare
benefits (Winship and Jencks 2004:3).
From the start however, this reform was controversial, and though signed into
law by President Bill Clinton, earlier it had been twice vetoed by him (Blank 2002).
When he finally did sign this bill, several of his top administrators and advisors resigned
in protest. It should not have come as a surprise however that Clinton might sign a bill of
this type. As far back as Clinton’s bid for the Arkansas governorship, he had advocated
for what he viewed as a shrinking working-class (Skocpol 2000:3). With the institution of
the PRWORA, Clinton could build and attend to the working class on whom he had
focused much of his gubernatorial and presidential campaigns. “The PRWORA
responded to concerns that AFDC encouraged joblessness” (Corcoran et al.,
2000:245); the assumptions of PRWORA fit nicely with Clinton’s campaign promises.
First, PRWORA was designed on the underlying premise that “almost all recipients can
get and keep jobs,” and secondly, that “regular work will eventually lead to a living wage
and self-sufficiency” (Corcoran et al., 2000:242). In essence, the PRWORA is designed
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to do less “to support the welfare poor and more for the working poor” (Ellwood
2000:196; Morgen and Maskovsky 2003). In a “handwriting on the wall” moment, in
1972, Herbert Gans wrote about the positive functions of poverty:
…the poor subsidize, directly and indirectly, many activities that benefit
the affluent… by virtue of the low wages which they receive… [They] subsidize
the governmental economy… Poverty creates jobs for a number of occupations
and professions which serve the poor, or shield the rest of the population from
them (Gans 1972:278-79).
The Clinton reforms stood unobstructed for a period of several years until in
2006, President Bush signed the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA). This Act added
to the already existing PRWORA with even more stringent work standards, including an
increase in the percentages of welfare recipients who were required to work (from 50
percent of a welfare worker’s caseload to 70 percent) while maintaining the requirement
of part time work for single parents who had small children (Reintsma 2007:3). It is
important to note here that the requirement to work for welfare recipients has been a
part of the public welfare policy equation since the early 1960s. At that time, in part due
to rapid social shifting in perceptions of women in the workforce, Congress began
requiring welfare recipients who did not have children to register to look for work in
order to receive their benefits. However, no real effort was made to enforce this rule as
the welfare rolls stayed stable throughout the first half of the nineties. Only with the
rapid increase in rolls at the end of the 1990s did the federal government begin to take
notice of how the states were implementing policies related to welfare and work
(Reintsma 2007:4).
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As Jencks (1992:20) asserts, if we want to create a net of workable social
welfare policies, both conservatives and liberals will have to “give ground.” He suggests
that conservatives will have to “abandon the pretense that all single mothers could get
along without government help if only they had jobs,” while liberals will have to
“abandon the idea that single mothers have a right to government help even if they are
not willing to take a low-wage job” (1992:20). This is clearly the main idea behind the
PRWORA. Echoing the assertion of Jencks, Reintsma (2007:12) states, “there will
always be a fine line between providing for the truly needy and preventing abuse of the
system by those who could work… the balance between these two will be reflected in
policies that are the result of a combination of prevailing ideological beliefs… and
economic conditions.”
In a more pointed discussion on the failures of contemporary welfare reforms,
Morgen and Maskovsky (2003:325) assert that there is “extensive evidence that most
jobs the poor get provide neither living wages nor the health insurance or job stability
that are essential for a modicum of economic security.” Relying on the work of Korpi and
Palme (1998), Jesuit and Mahler (2004:8) assert a “paradox of redistribution” whereby
“the more we target benefits to the poor… the less likely we are to reduce poverty and
inequality.” One of the reasons why this occurs is that “highly targeted programs have
the support of a small and isolated political base [that] offers “no rational base for a
coalition between those above and those below the poverty line” (Jesuit and Mahler
2004:8-9).
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The assertion that the PRWORA has worked, therefore, is very premature.
Because states were given increasing latitude regarding how they distributed federal
welfare funds, disagreement of a clear definition of poverty ensued. Where the federal
government had utilized the Orshansky Poverty Thresholds since the 1960s (Fisher
1997), and prior to PRWORA had used these guidelines to distribute federal funds to
states, with the passage of PRWORA, states were given the discretion to redefine what
poverty meant and how it would be managed.
While welfare rolls dropped from the period of 1994 through 2004 (Ribar 2005)
we cannot point to only one reason. Grogger (2004:405; Grogger and Michalopoulos
2003) asserts that the drop was an “anticipatory response to time limits.” Supportive of
Grogger’s earlier research, there is increasing evidence that many individuals are living
“between the cracks” of work and welfare, meaning they make too much money for
welfare assistance, yet not enough to lift themselves out of their economic
circumstances. For many of these families, there is a convergence of “credit constraints”
coupled with “substantial earnings uncertainty” (Grogger 2004:406). In conjunction with
time constraints, as state welfare caseloads (possibly as a result of the lack of a
cohesive definition of what exactly constitutes a welfare “case”) plummeted the
economy boomed (Blank 2007). While there is some research exploring the theoretical
implications of welfare reforms, to make an assertion at this time based on statistical
analysis of “hard” data would be reckless. One question that this conversation does not
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address, however, is paramount: are former welfare recipients better off now that they
are in the labor force? Evidence points toward an answer of “no.”
Difficulty in making meaningful comparisons across states is a product of the
PRWORA. Reintsma (2007) adds to the increasing body of research which points to
how difficult any comparative analysis of a “before reform” versus “after reform” type will
be. Not only do we have to contend with front and back end changes, we also have to
factor in new state definitions of what exactly constitutes a “case.” As one example of
the complexity of aggregated analysis in the face of decentralization she states:
The dramatic decline in… TANF caseload from 1994 to 1999 was touted
by many as a sign of the success of the 1996 welfare legislation. This decline
has since slowed to a near halt, and following the 2001 recession, caseloads
rose… Care must be taken in interpreting this data… The definition of what
comprises a caseload has become increasingly murky… states are increasingly
placing individuals and families ineligible for the federal TANF program into
separate state-funded programs, with the result that these persons no longer
appear on the official caseload figures… Among these groups are recipients that
have exceeded the… lifetime five year limit, and groups which are ineligible
under federal rules… (Reintsma 2007:11).
Reintsma (2007:11) goes on to assert that some states have created “parallel
programs” which serve to keep people off of federal GAO reports. The numbers of
Americans living in poverty began increasing again in 2000 yet success has still been
claimed by the proponents of the PRWORA (Schram 2005). In light of the Census data
about poverty rates and the number of Americans living in poverty, however, a direct
causal relationship cannot be asserted about the success of the PRWORA in
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decreasing poverty. It is important to note that while the PRWORA can claim success in
decreasing the welfare rolls, this does not indicate a reduction in poverty overall.
Perhaps more weight should be given to the relationship between the robustness
of the economy and the drop in welfare recipient numbers (Corcoran et al., 2000). It
would seem that the health of the economy may be more of an indicator of dropping
welfare rolls than reforms undertaken in the 1990s. As Ribar (2005:517) asserts, there
is support for the notion that “a strong local economy [improves] employment and
earnings for low-skill women and men.” His analysis shows that local labor market
conditions are a significant determinant with regard to the use of welfare and the
economics of single mothers (he further shows that access to child care is also
significant). As new data begins to appear within the body of research, attention will
surely be paid to whether the decentralization of welfare and the impacts of the
PRWORA have been successful to date, and whether they will be successful over time.
It is clearly difficult to know exactly the extent of the latent and manifest functions
(or for that matter, dysfunctions) of current welfare reform. As mentioned by Winship
and Jencks (2004:4), current reforms have changed the rules at the front end of welfare
(for those who are attempting to receive) and at the back end of welfare (for those who
are leaving welfare programs) and this indeed makes it difficult to form a useful
empirical “before and after PRWORA” test. When nearly all of the variables have
changed so significantly pre- and post-reform analysis can become meaningless.
Further, Hayden (2006:1) asserts that often, the tools by which we analyze policy are
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inadequate, and this type of inappropriate analysis can lead to a misunderstanding of
“complex socioecological and sociotechnical systems leading to wasted resources,
policy failure, and frustration.” Morgen and Maskovsky (2003:324) attest that “new
welfare policies have undermined the strategies many poor families had developed to
survive when welfare “work” requirements interfere with informal sector revenuegenerating activities and mutual aid of kin.”
We can see then, how the decentralizing of myriad social service programs has
made it more difficult to make pre- and post-welfare program comparisons. Coupled
with decentralization, retrenchment of policy may be inevitable. Hacker assesses US
public social programs as largely having been able to avoid radical attempts at
retrenchment, but further asserts that there are two less visible tensions inherent within
the retrenchment paradigm:
First, in policy areas that rely substantially on public-private or
intergovernmental cooperation, the shifting aims of benefit sponsors and
administrators has transformed the ground-level operation of formally stable
policies, at times quite radically. Second, and perhaps even more important,
recent decades have witnessed an accelerating process [called] “risk
privatization” in which stable social policies have come to cover a declining
portion of the salient risks faced by citizens (Hacker 2004:243-4).
Supporting Hacker, there is an increasing amount of literature which shows the
number of single mothers living in poverty (neither working nor on welfare) is increasing
(Blank 2007). In essence, welfare in America is in a state of flux, with countless
changes that point to a need for continued diligent analysis over time and across
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programs to determine the impacts of state administration as well as the benefits and
drawbacks of federal reforms.
Social Policy Theories and Themes

There are centuries-long debates about the appropriate role of government with
regard to economic affairs at both the macro and the micro levels. In Wealth of Nations,
Adam Smith (1776:129) argues that individuals will be led as if “by an invisible hand” in
order to best serve the interests of the public. Smith asserts that competition will lead
not to the unequal distribution of scarce resources, rather that it will lead to efficient
allocation of economic resources (Reintsma 2007:35). Smith’s work gave rise to the
Pareto model, which states that if an economy changes by making one person better-off
while making no one worse-off, then social welfare has improved. Smith and Pareto
have served to influence modern day economics and by association, modern welfare
policy.
More contemporarily and perhaps with a nod toward progressive social welfare
policy, in the early 1900s, Addams (1914:3) asserted that “governments all over the
world are insisting that it is their function, and theirs alone, so to regulate social and
industrial conditions that a desirable citizenship may be secured.”
Although logic-of-industrialism theories were once considered accurate to predict
the efficiency of welfare programs, research since the early 1980s points to a different
mechanism (Skocpol and Amenta 1986; Korpi 2008). Borrowing on the early work of
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Korpi, Skocpol and Amenta (1986:140) define social policy to include “in principle, all of
the ways in which the state enters into the distributive process of the capitalist
democracies.” Korpi (2008:4) states that in this type of arrangement the dominant
assets are economic ones which can be concentrated to small groups who tend to
prefer “distributive processes in the context of markets.” Skocpol and Amenta go on to
interpret Korpi’s early work to state that social policy is crafted without regard to whether
or not the market has allocated prior income to individuals.
Finally, Skocpol and Amenta utilize the work of Korpi to show that the allocation
of social policy is one characteristic of the institutionalization of social democracies, with
that pattern including “programs to prevent social ills from arising in the first place; a
predominance of universal and progressively tax-financed social benefits, rather than
selective, contributory, or regressively financed social benefits; programs offering better
than minimal benefits to citizens; and a high degree of social provision directly through
the state rather than through private organization, yet without bureaucratic controls over
individual conduct” (1986:141). These characteristics point toward a discussion of
power resources theory and one could certainly argue whether this profile fits the
current welfare ideology of the United States.
Power resources theory asserts that with a stronger political left and heavier
concentration of union organization, more egalitarian social welfare policies will be
crafted (Korpi 2008; Kellerman 2005). The idea underlying power resources theory is
that the “level of inequality in a society and the accompanying degree of redistribution
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by the state are functions of the organizational resources of the working class”
(Kellerman 2005:3, relying on Korpi 1983 and Stephens 1979; Beland and Hacker
2004).This means that, during times of a strong conservative right, stronger
retrenchment is likely to occur and conversely with a strong and organized left, more
progressive outcomes will be achieved.
The Marxist orientation of power resources theory is not to be overlooked.
According to Kellerman (2005:3), this model is “firmly rooted in a class-based
conception of politics in which capital and labor have opposite preferences over the
level of inequality and where “the absence of organization through either labor unions or
political parties representing their interests… allows capital owners to control the vast
majority of power resources in the economy.” In a comparative study of municipal
service delivery in Canada and the US, it was found that Canadian cities and towns
provide more services than their American counterparts, even while the Canadian cities
sampled have a higher rate of privatization of municipal services. It is theorized that the
reasons for these differences are somewhat linked to the strength (and converse
weakness) of organized “labour opposition” (Hebdon and Jalette 2008). This indeed
appears to be a workable theory with regard to contemporary American welfare policy.
The “poverty to perversity” theme is one that not only appears cyclically in our
research literature on welfare and welfare policy reforms, it also appears to be a popular
conservative political tool that can be utilized to gain support from the public. Even more
alarming is how the perversity theme helps to shape the reality of minority groups in our
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society. Because the United States has been free of any recognized history of
feudalism, this “denies most Americans a default class based way to think about the
conditions of the poor,” (Shaw 2007:xvii) and instead fosters the use of an individualistic
lens which in turn “tempts many Americans to label the poor as deviant.”
According to Skocpol and Block (2005:266), the process of traveling “from
poverty to perversity” needs three external conditions. An impending crisis of the current
regime is the first step in reframing social policy issues. Second, a publicly fought battle
must occur between the existing regime and the new ideas/ideals. Finally, once the
extreme ideas of the newcomer are established they gain mainstream legitimacy and
can be established as the only solution for the existing malfunctioning regime. If we
accept Skocpol and Block’s assertions, then it is possible that the seeds of social policy
change grow from the ability of charismatic politicians to utilize and/or repurpose the
perversity thesis to reframe the way we accept, view and think about welfare.
Thinking back on the Reagan administration’s ability to reframe structural issues
related to poverty into individual shortcomings, we can see how this process works.
And, as Hudson and Coukos (2005:6) have pointed out, “the clinical verdict is in—the
poor are not only lazy, they also suffer from “low impulse control.” And for those who are
foolish enough to squander their meager earnings on cable television, Suze Orman is
there, urging them to repent, five nights a week.” Reagan’s reframing, it appears, has
been successful.
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If we are able to frame the structural issues of welfare as the perversity issues of
individuals, then it is a short hop to a “residuals” theme which begins to emerge,
garnering popularity with an otherwise seemingly prosperous nation who can then point
to the poor and state “There’s something wrong with you. You must work harder, longer
hours. You must save every extra penny and stop squandering the opportunities of the
American Dream!” It is asserted that the problems of poverty are somehow “a
consequence of [one’s] own moral failure” (Hudson and Coukos 2005:7).
Individualizing the structural issues of poverty is a problem of extremes. It
manifests itself in the beliefs of many Americans that “the continuing problem of racial
[and by extension gendered and class] inequality is one of individual weakness” (Poole
2006:2). Rather the same as “poverty to perversity,” by moving toward a residuals
approach to welfare, we have ignored the history of structural racism, sexism and
classism in favor of a view which places the onus of responsibility for issues relating to
poverty on struggling individuals.
Policy feedback theories have gained in popularity over the past few decades
with regard to speculating about welfare (Amenta, Bonastia and Caren 2001:221).
Feedback policies assert that, as it gained in popularity, the “poverty as perversity”
theme served to reinforce the government’s retrenchment of social welfare policies
under the PRWORA. According to Amenta et al., “The initial form a program assumes
may influence its political future by determining whether groups will mobilize around it in
support.” Relying on the analyses of several researchers, they point out that distributive
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programs have greater support than do redistributive programs, and moreover, that
“programs whose recipients are confined to the poor tend to gain little support” (Amenta,
Bonastia and Caren 2001:221). Simply put, as the shortcomings of contemporary
welfare programs came to light coupled with the conservative views of the Reagan era,
a withdrawal (or retrenchment) of progressive redistributive programs was inevitable.
PRWORA is a distributive program, a sort of “quid pro quo” welfare, which
distributes necessities in exchange for the work of recipients. In conjunction with the
“poverty as perversity” theme, policy feedback theory seems to present a reasonable
explanation for the retrenchment of contemporary welfare policy.
Postmodernism also has something to say with regard to social policy.
Postmodernist theory challenges the foundations of objectivity in social science
research. If we cannot implicitly rely on scientific objectivity we must contend with
stereotypical representations of subordinate groups which mar our ability to craft solid
and meaningful social welfare policy. Katz (2000:117) states that “not only
postmodernism but the stubborn persistence of stereotypes about poverty, welfare and
race in the face of credible social science calls into question the capacity of research to
lead where public opinion and political will are not ready to follow.”
Within the last few years, “target efficiency” has also made a mark in the political
arena with regard to effective welfare policy making and delivery. This idea, as
described by Schuck and Zeckhauser in their 2006 book, Targeting in Social Programs
Avoiding Bad Bets, Removing Bad Apples, states that a concentrated effort needs to be
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made with regard to removing from the equation the few “bad bets” and “bad apples”
and their ability to effectively disrupt the delivery of benefits to those truly in need (the
authors call those who they classify as truly in need as the “bad draws”) (4). They
further state, “the basic goal of target efficiency—allocating resources to the individuals
for whom and the purposes for which they will do the most good—is straightforward and
should not be controversial” (4); however, they go on to assert that politics tend to get in
the way of the intentions of target efficiency models, with conservatives fearing that
efforts to improve targeting will be costly, and liberals fearing that targeting will
essentially result in victim blaming (4-5). While the book goes on to debate the merits of
this model and sends out a bipartisan plea for those middle-ground redistributionists to
embrace the reforms that target efficiency requires, much of the authors’ work is
abstract and theoretical. Further, while Schuck and Zeckhauser would have us believe
that target efficiency modeling is something new to the welfare issue, there is research
dating back to the ‘90s which shows that targeting some over others with regard to
welfare pits groups against one another rather than forging meaningful coalitions which
can work together to better the conditions of all (Jesuit and Mahler 2004).
One theme that works well alongside target efficiency is that of decentralization
which is another of our contemporary themes framing welfare and social policies in the
United States. Decentralization adds one important research caution: aggregated data
may not be the way to go for analysis of policy and inequality as it does little to uncover
the real experiences and situations of minorities, or for that matter, anyone. For
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example, while it is asserted that median incomes for all groups of women in America
have increased since the late 1980s, this does little to highlight the fact that for all
women, median incomes are still below the federal poverty line (Andersen 2001:188),
with some groups of women faring substantially worse than others. Andersen further
shows that income growth has been shown in the top 20 percent of all racial groups,
while for all other quintiles, growth has not occurred. Aggregating data masks the fact
that the lowest fifth of our population have experienced a decline in income growth, with
Hispanics and African Americans being impacted the most. Andersen states that
“persistent structural inequality is simply less visible to dominant groups” (2001:190).
And, aggregating data certainly does not help to fully express the issues related to
inequality surrounding race, gender and class.
Winship and Jencks acknowledge that while it is not wise to assume that welfare
reform is the cause, or even correlational, it appears that single mothers have fared
better since welfare reform than before it (when looking at food security and poverty
rates in the US). Their study, however, was only from the periods of 2000 through 2006,
when the highest rate of unemployment reached nationwide was 6.0 percent. In
addition, food security is only one small measurement with regard to welfare and thus
Winship and Jencks’ assertion must be viewed with caution. Blank and Schoeni
(2003:308) also caution that it is premature to discuss the impacts of welfare reforms,
as many states have recipients who are (within the past few years) just beginning to
reach time limits. They assert that “it is possible that the positive income effects of
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penalties aimed at forcing women into work will be reduced once a large share of
women actually hit the time limits and are forced off welfare involuntarily.”
Blank (2002:1119) illustrates a decreasing poverty rate from 1979 through 2000
utilizing Census data. The data show that for all groups analyzed (all families, families
with single-female householders, Black families with single-female householders, and
Hispanic families with single-female householders) the rate of poverty fell from that of
1979. This does not, however mean that that welfare reforms are the cause of the
decrease in the poverty rate—again, the data were collected just as the first welfare
recipients were being impacted by the five-year limits imposed by PRWORA.
Somewhat contrary to some of his prior research assertions, in a PBS interview
Jencks states that “every measure of the distribution of income shows that the rich have
gained a great deal more than the poor gained since the 1970s.” Further, Jencks and
Ellwood (2001:57) rely on Census data to state that from 1967 to 1998, the rich have
gotten richer while the poor have not gotten poorer, however, adding that “the gains of
the rich seem to influence what happens to those whose incomes do not change.” This
is a rather Friedman-esque statement. What this tells us however (and in opposition to
the ideas of Milton Friedman) is that in a society with increasing economic disparity, one
where an increasing level of wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few, the gains of
welfare reform (such as getting a job and getting off the rolls) are outweighed and
marginal.
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Somewhat supportive of the views of Winship and Jencks is O’Connor
(2000:548), who, relying on the work of Solow and Parrot, states that the primary result
of the PRWORA seems to have been to push “many a dependent family into the
already-swelled ranks of the working poor.” Okongwu and Mechner (2000:110) state
that “…Reaganomics, along with welfare reform in the United States, have given rise to
an ever-increasing population of people lacking access to work that provides adequate
pay, leading to homelessness.” Echoing these statements, Dias and Maynard-Moody
(2006:190) state that current research on performance based contracts shows that the
contracts awarded to for-profit employment agencies tend to “focus on short term
deliverables… at the expense of longer term goals like employment quality and job
retention.” Ogonkwu and Mechner (2000:110) further state that, “[c]omparing the United
States to Namibia… extreme inequality in each society results from policy decisions that
lead to the lack of access to meaningful employment and to a high percentage of
female-headed households.”
Katz (2000:124) asserts that since 1980, the welfare state has rolled back
benefits and that this contemporary “redefinition, which threatens African Americans
and other minorities, results from three forces… dependence, devolution and markets.
A war on dependence, notably but far from exclusively on young unmarried mothers;
the devolution of authority from the federal government to states, from states to
localities, and from public to private agencies; and the application of market models to
social policy: these three forces course through all the corners of America’s welfare
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state.” Further evidence of continued inequality comes from Andersen (2001:185), who
states that “those in the lowest 20th percentile of the labor force have experienced a
22% drop in wages since the 1970s.” Corcoran et al. (2000:248), assert that while
“caseloads are falling rapidly” since PRWORA reforms, it is not clear why this is
occurring. They theorize that the drop could be the result of stricter enforcement of
sanctions, or because of recipient non-compliance. Preliminarily, their research shows
that caseloads are down and more welfare mothers than ever have joined the
workforce; they are, however, reluctant to attribute this to the successes of the
PRWORA, instead asserting (as other research supports) that the robust economy was
a predominant factor (Corcoran et al.,2000: 251).
Myles and Quadagno (2000:157) discuss the “Third Way” approach to modern
welfare reforms. Their use of the “Third Way” metaphor, which was popularized by Tony
Blair, “emphasize programs that help people to participate and succeed in the market
through education, training, and programs that sustain labor force participation.” Known
also as the “New Policy Agenda,” this approach is seen to “comprise two principle
strategies—marketization/privatization of economic and social sectors and
democratization of civil society (Kamat 2004:170). This paradigm aligns nicely with
PRWORA reforms as it speaks to “flexible labor markets” while aiming to provide
“people with the means to prosper in such an environment through education and
training, family support systems (to help people enter the labor market) and wage and
tax incentives (to keep them there)” (Myles and Quadango 2000:157).
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What comes into focus with this explanation of themes relating to welfare is one
thing: the view that many Americans hold of those who need assistance has been, is,
and will likely continue to be problematic as reforms are enacted. And as Lindsley
(2004:207) succinctly reminds us, “an important point to be understood is that in a
regulated economy such as the United States, poverty among a large portion of the
population cannot be an accidental or unavoidable phenomenon, but rather is the result
of economic or political policies that for whatever reason skew the distribution of the
nation’s wealth.”
While there is support for both arguments (that welfare reforms have helped the
poor and that welfare reforms have not helped the poor) one thing is certain: the
positions of the poor, much like the positions of women and other minorities in society
when compared to the often invisibly privileged positions of white males, are relational
to the positions of the non-poor. If we view the structural issues surrounding poverty
relationally, it is easier to envision how the problems of the poor continue in our society
when poorly crafted welfare policies and stereotypes enter the discourse. As of this
writing, the national unemployment rate is perilously close to double digits (CPS), and
faced with the economic crisis of today will undoubtedly, continue to climb. And, while
the impacts of this recession will be felt by all save the very wealthy, the long term
consequences will be structurally embedded within the struggles of the less fortunate for
many years to come. As Ellwood (2000:193) points out, “a reform designed to support
people who are working fails if people cannot find work, even temporarily.” My research
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will consider the preceding discussions about welfare policy and about perceptions of
the needy.
Linking the Welfare of the Family and Child Safety

Just because one is poor does not mean they will also abuse their child. While
this seems a rather ridiculous statement to make, there are many who assume that
“poor” equals “bad parent.” While there are some significant links between poverty and
parenting, a closer examination is warranted.
Ms. Heather Howlett, Operations and Management Consultant for the Florida
Department of Children and Families, states that the impacts of neglect and abuse with
regard to the development of the child are far reaching. Developmental delays in the
infant brain are followed by developmental delays in the child’s performance at school.
During the school years, acting out can be indicated, and these increases in disruptive
behavior over time can be overwhelming once a child reaches adulthood; substance
abuse often becomes an avenue to dealing with the impacts of childhood neglect.
We do know that maltreatment of children is linked to poverty, but we must be
careful to clarify this relationship. According to Wulczyn’s 2009 evaluation of data from
the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS), maltreatments occur at
a higher rate among the poor than the wealthy, and while this may seem to be intuitively
valid, I must place some caution on this statement. What we know about the links
between maltreatment and poverty are not necessarily indicative of physical abuse.
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Rather, the relationship between class and child welfare is more likely to be indicative of
neglect. The parents of poor children work more hours, have less time to spend with
children and children of the poor are often charged with caring for their own selves at
very young ages (Waldfogel Craigie and Brooks-Gunn 2010; Howard and Brooks-Gunn
2009). Parentification of older children can also be common with older siblings often
being charged with the care of their younger counterparts. Wulczyn (42) asserts that
maltreatments often occur due to the gap between “what a child needs and what a
parent can give as a child passes through childhood.”
Children who come in contact with social service systems due to myriad reasons
are often children of the poor (Stagner and Lansing 2009). While we do not exactly
understand this relationship, there are several ideas which can help us to clarify.
Middle-class and wealthy parents can afford afterschool care for their children, while
poor children often have to self-monitor their behavior. This can lead to troubles with law
enforcement or in school, which often then leads to involvement with child welfare
agencies.
The children of poor single parents suffer as single parents are often not able to
be as frequently responsive to the needs of their children; they are often at work for
many hours, and when home, are tired from working. While single parents may not
necessarily have poorer parenting skills than other parents, research suggests that lack
of access to resources is a factor (Waldfogel, Craigie and Brooks-Gunn 2010).
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Each state in the US has different criteria for reporting and opening cases, which
could also be contributing to the gap. One of the most challenging issues facing federal
child abuse and neglect clearinghouses is that each state has its own definitions and
thresholds of exactly what constitutes abuse, neglect and abandonment of children.
We also know from myriad sources that when the economy is stable, child abuse
rates tend to fall (Wulczyn 2009, Finkelhor and Jones 2006). This might mean that when
the poor are working, and low-skill jobs are abundant, poor parents experience one less
stressor. Conversely, it might mean that poorer parents who are likely to abuse spend
less time in the home and more time on the job which would contribute to a decrease in
the overall rates of child abuse among this group. It will be interesting to see how, in
light of the current mega-recession, child abuse rates will vary from the last several
years of relative stability. We can also see a relationship between the economy, access
to work and geographic location.
Molnar et al. (2008) conclude that physical neighborhood locations have some
connection to children and their involvement with social service and juvenile justice
systems. Their research found that neighborhood resources can work in conjunction
with family and peer resources to keep children out of trouble. If we understand this
information in the context of poor or wealthy communities, it is easy to see why poorer
children may have higher incidences of involvement with our child welfare systems.
All of these concerns are very challenging and, from the perspective of those
concerned with trying to alleviate these types of social issues, daunting. It might seem
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better to simply pass off the responsibility of this kind of work to private agencies. Being
able to distance the government from dealing with issues related to child welfare, or any
other cost-ineffective state agency for that matter, has become an attractive proposition
for many states.
Privatization Efforts: Who is Privatizing?

Kamat (2004:554) asserts that the twentieth century “represented a ‘top-down’
approach to social and economic growth” and further that we will move away from that
model toward one which will sustain “’bottom up growth and social improvement.” And
while most people with concerns in the area of welfare provisions and delivery are in
agreement that some form of government oversight and regulation is warranted, the
extent to which they feel federal and state governments should be involved varies
(Michaels 2010; Bridkin 2007; Fossett and Thompson 2005).
In one view, proponents of a narrower form of regulation argue for increased
roles for market-based privatization. In opposition, larger and more powerful
government involvement is viewed as essential. A third focus supports localization of
welfare concerns. Dating as far back as the early 1900s, there was acknowledgment in
the sociological and political research that “the very crux of local self-government, as
has been well said, is involved in the right to locally determine the scope of local
government in response to the local needs as they arise” (Addams 1905:427).
Regardless of these ideologically opposed viewpoints, “[f]ederal policies of privatization

34

and devolution, embraced since the Reagan years, have made private, nonprofit
organizations the primary deliverers of these services” (Marwell 2004:265). Further,
advocates of privatization say that it will make for a “leaner and meaner” government
which has the promise of greater efficiency and cost savings (Michaels 718). However
whether cost savings and efficiency have become actuality is up for debate.
In 1983, Hatry conducted a review of public and private prisons in Washington
DC, and he found that cost-saving results were mixed. He further asserts that public
agencies only privatize when there are internal problems, and that this will also be a
factor in overall betterment of performance. It is important to note that Hatry also asserts
that this happens in the converse—when private agencies experiencing trouble are
taken over by the government. Further as one (2004) state-level report asserts, “[a]fter
the fact reviews cast doubt on the savings claims made for maintenance [transportation
and road repair] outsourcing (Washington State DOT).
In addition to the shift from public to private comes a basic difference in the way
in which monies are allocated for the poor and to the poor. Prior to privatization, welfare
money was viewed as an entitlement (Hudson and Coukos 2005:1) which meant that
regardless of how much money welfare provisions cost the government one need only
to apply and meet the requirements to receive their ‘entitlement.’ In recent years,
“NPOs… deliver the majority of state-funded direct services to citizens” that are
“supported by discretionary government spending, which is subject to regular
appropriations by Congress and state and local legislators” (Marwell 2004:266). This
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means that there is room for the amount of money which is allocated to fall short of the
demand, and which could foster an unhealthy competition among local services
providers to ‘low-ball’ their bids in order to receive a piece of the federal pie (to speak
nothing of contributing to the numbers of poor who may not be able to apply for of
receive assistance when the budget runs dry). It seems that the clients—the poor—may
be an afterthought in the rush to create new agencies for the demand that privatization
has brought on.
Kamat (2004:160) states that the assignation of contracts to not-for-profit
organizations (NPOs) non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community based
organizations (CBOs) and grass roots organizations (GROs) represents a “franchising”
of the state whereby state-level structural changes to policy coupled with decreased
spending has led to a proliferation of NPOs, NGOs, CBOs and GROs. And Nightingale
and Pindus (1997) assert that this can be problematic as privatization brings along with
it cost-savings efforts which could impact service delivery and service interruption as
agencies compete for contracts.
As Blank (2000:C34) states, “as part of U.S. welfare reform states are giving
contracts to for-profit firms to run job training and placement programmes… advocates
have called for increasing privatisation of elementary and secondary education… and
the U.S. debate over Social Security reform includes a variety of proposals to ‘privatise’
Social Security.” Marwell (2004:267) asserts that “privatization has been applied at the
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federal state, county and city levels to a wide variety of service, from road maintenance
to weapons development to human service provision.”
Because there are myriad ways in which public and private sectors can intersect
and interact to deliver a countless variety of welfare programs, it is difficult to provide an
exact definition of what exactly is meant by “privatization.” As Marwell (2004:266) points
out: services can “vary greatly in their quality and effectiveness, depending on the skills
and practices of the service providers.” While this is not preclusive to private versus
public delivery, it is an area which needs to be explored with regard to any differences
which might be present between private and public agency care.
Essentially, privatization is the process of contracting public services to private
agencies which either work in profit or in nonprofit capacities. Adjunct to this definition
then, there are some basic questions that should be addressed with respect to
privatization of social services. According to Blank (2000:C36) they are: “1) What are
the problems faced by the private provision of social services? 2) What are the
alternative models of public sector involvement? and 3) Under what circumstances is
government management and ownership likely to lead to a superior provision of social
services?” We can add some additional pertinent questions: 1) Is private provision less
expensive than state provision of social services? 2) Does the quality of service suffer
when administered by private entities?
Coupled with decisions to privatize, come concerns about devolution, which is
the “transfer of decisions regarding the details of spending public funds from the federal
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government to states, counties and municipalities” (Marwell 2004:268). In essence, due
to the sheer numbers of differences in agency models, privatization and devolution
make it, at best, difficult to understand the delivery, quality and impacts of private social
service provision as compared to public administration of the same programs (Kamat
2004:156).
Blank (2000:C43) makes the assertions that regardless of whether delivery is
public or private, administration of programs which are successful relies on
professionals who are able to do their jobs well. Further, Marwell (2000:267) asserts
that the assignation of state contracts to NPOs determines “where services are
available, how individuals access them, and ultimately who benefits from public
spending for the poor.”
As an example, in Brevard County, privatization occurred with nearly all public
family safety/child welfare employees being usurped into the hierarchy of the private
agencies who procured contracts with the lead agency, and by default, the state. In
essence, the same public employees became private hires. What is at debate is
whether the functions of their jobs remained the same. Some questions that we can ask
are: 1) How have occupational roles changed with the switch from public to private? 2)
Have caseworker perceptions of program efficiency changed with the shift to
privatization, and if so, how? and 3) What are the repercussions of the change to private
agency management?
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To understand the implications of privatization within the sphere of public/social
safety work, and to answer the questions above, we must have the ability to define and
measure outcomes as well as the capacity to employ workers with specialized expertise
(van Slyke 2003).
There is some evidence that community based organizations tend to depoliticize
some issues through a process of moving away from the traditional global effort to raise
the consciousness of people about the particulars of a social problems toward a more
individualized approach which requires the local CBO to understand the issue from a
local perspective and to apply innovative solutions to the problem at the local level
(Kamat 2004).
There is also some evidence that the historical models we have used for child
abuse prevention/intervention in the US are not particularly good at prevention, and are
marginally good at intervention. Howard and Brooks-Gunn (2009:119) suggest that
“overall researchers have found little evidence that home-visiting programs directly
prevent child abuse and neglect” however, their findings also support that home visits
do help to re-educate parents who are lacking positive parenting skills (119).
Attempts by myriad researchers have fallen short of adequately and inclusively
defining maltreatment (Stagner and Lansing 2009), and this places a strain on models
which rely on reaction rather than prevention. Localized models of care may be able to
better predict maltreatments as their understandings of their clientele are deeper and
more contextual than a statewide model of care can be.
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In all cases however, “the question is whether one can trust individuals in the
market to make appropriate choices of whether there is a role for a more omniscient
(and thereby more powerful) government to intervene actively in [these] decisions”
(Blank 2000:C42). My study will build on the “public versus private” debate and will
explore the innovations of local applications of federal and state mandates by examining
the ways in which caseworkers do their jobs.
Successes and Failures
Berry, Brower and Flowers (2000:339) wrote that, beginning in the early 1990s,
“the Florida Legislature responded to a citizen-led initiative demanding a better return
on their tax dollars.” Performance-based budgeting (PB) was incorporated by the
Legislature as a response to the public outcry for agency reforms. With this shift, the
Legislature was able to set up budget controls which included mission statements, and
measurements of program success which were based on specific objectives. This type
of management is clearly results oriented, and the public perception of this framework is
that it is more efficient than “traditional” government oversight of taxpayer monies. It is
possible that the push for agency accountability and reforms was the spark that led to
decentralization and then to privatization.
Tied closely to PB initiatives is the concept of decentralization, which can be
thought of as an initial step toward privatization. By the mid 1990s, the Legislature
agreed to require a move to privatization for key government agencies. The key
question that we must ask with regard to privatization is whether or not it is successful.
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The answer that we find is dependent upon many factors. According o research done by
Chi, Arnold and Perkins (2003:12), “many state agency directors surveyed seem to
have no clear ideas as to how much has actually been saved from privatization.” By his
count, any expected savings have been marginal, and in many cases, there has been
no cost savings at all.
With regard to the state of Florida, several state-level agencies have privatized
with mixed results. Florida has been at the forefront of privatization, with a staunch
conservative political base, legislators have been able to jettison many agency functions
to private for profit and not for profit groups. The Florida Department of Corrections
boasts six privately run prisons (about 10 percent of the total prisons).
Why Privatize Family Safety?

Several arguments have been asserted as to why the FDCF was slated to
“privatize.” Additionally, arguments can be made about whether this paradigm shift from
public to private market welfare management has been positive or negative for one of
the State’s most vulnerable populations—abused and neglected children. Most
concerned would probably agree that it is too soon to tell. Since most private family
safety agencies have only been operating for a few short years, a review of the “hard”
evidence at this time would certainly prove to be premature. However, as Marwell
(2004:265) points out, “Federal policies of privatization and devolution [delegation of
authority to a substitute and a transfer of power to local entities from a larger
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governmental unit], embraced since the Reagan years, have made private, nonprofit
organizations the primary deliverers of these services.” Further, as Breaux, Duncan,
Keller and Morris (2002:92) point out, there has been a strong “movement toward the
devolution of federal policy to states” in recent years.”
Somers and Block (2004) state essentially the same idea; however, they extend
Marwell’s ideas to relate private family safety agencies to the rise of market
fundamentalism, culminating in 1996 welfare systems reforms and continuing with the
privatization of associated government agencies. Somers and Block (2004: 268) rely on
work by Osborne and Gaebler (1993) and Teles (1998), and state that “central to a
broader bipartisan movement toward ‘devolution’ of government programs, TANF
[Temporary Aid to Needy Families] block grants ended the legal recognition of public
assistance as an entitlement—” an attitude which could have potentially fueled the
further devolution of TANF funding toward allocation of State funds to private agencies.
Paralleling the research of Marwell and Somers and Block, Nancy Jurik (2004:1) states
that “we now live in a society characterized by hyper-privatization that is reconstructing
everything from non-profits and government to community, family, and individual life—
all in the image of the market.” Foreshadowing the market-like restructuring of welfare
systems in Florida, Myles and Quadagno (2000:156) perhaps asked the quintessential
question: “Who needs a welfare state when we have markets?”
Every state is charged with the responsibility of administering programs which
address essential needs of abused and neglected children, and those programs must

42

comply with Federal guidelines in order for the state to be eligible for Federal funding
(Child Welfare Information Gateway 2009:1). The purpose of the State of Florida’s Child
Protection Program is “to provide for the care, safety, and protection of abused or
neglected children in an environment that fosters healthy social, emotional, intellectual,
and physical development” (“Justification Review of the Child Protection Program
2001”).
Linking Child Safety to Privatization
While the movement toward privatization is not contained to family safety,
government enthusiasm for child saving efforts has not historically been a valued
component of our government services sector. Framing social and family services as
“charity” for women and children has not been an uncommon historical practice (Gordon
1988). Private agencies are not new either, with a history of private agency
empowerment allowing workers to “legally intrude upon working-class households with
little regard to family privacy or parental rights” (Vandepol 1982:225).
The problematic charity label serves to influence public perceptions about what
exactly it is child saving agencies do. Efforts in the mid- to late 1800s were aimed at the
“cruelty of parents,” as expressed in the charter of the Massachusetts Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children—one of the first large metropolitan child saving
agencies in the United States. The purpose of the agency was to awaken an “interest in
the abuses to which children are exposed by the… cruelty of parents” while also
assisting law enforcement in the imposition of existing laws (Pratt Fairchild 1913:556).
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Gordon (1988) brings up a parallel point: the establishment of child saving
agencies also fueled the perception of eroding away at the patriarchal “right” of males
within the family sphere. This all occurred prior to significant academic references to
sexism, ageism, or feminism and was defined by powerful businessmen and community
leaders in a negative light. It continues today, according to Katha Pollitt (2011), in the
form of “federal, state and local government cutbacks [aimed specifically at women and
children], touted as neutral and necessary belt-tightening.” Gordon (1988:56) further
reinforces this line of thought by asserting that “the new sensibility about children’s
rights and the concern about child abuse were signs that the patriarchal family
expectations and realities had… been weakening.”
Along with gender (and explicitly, childhood) I believe that there are some
important connections between race and class and the privatization of family safety
programs which speaks to the government’s willingness to jettison such a crucial social
service agency. Women’s and children’s concerns are not top government priorities,
and the chance to increase the distance between the government and the needs of
women and children might seem to some to be a logical way to control spending while
also deflecting responsibility for minorities. It has been the women’s right movement that
has championed governmental action against family violence (Gordon 1988), and with
the movement now in a period of relative calm, minimizing the government’s role is less
challenging.
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As the history of the child safety movement grew along with the feminist reform
sensibility of the day (Gordon 1988), an interesting phenomenon ensued. Powerful
women within some of the major child saving agencies in the 1900s were subordinated
to men who believed the roles of women should remain in the domain of home
organization, domestic skills, and moral sensibilities. As Gordon (1988) asserts, women
in the movement in many large metropolitan areas were told to “stay out of ‘politics,’”
and instead concentrate on organizing and cleanliness rather than management and
public speaking. Summarizing the 1976 work of Hartmann, Dressel (1987) asserts that
the problems of social welfare are indeed gendered, as our patriarchal system
continues a gendered division of labor in society which allows the problems of women to
be subverted.
At the Federal Level
Aside from the various technical differences between publicly and privately
administered child safety programs, it appears that at the federal level, child abuse
recurrence rates have diminished somewhat in recent years. According to a report
commissioned by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services titled Child
Welfare Outcomes 2002-2005, sixty four percent of states “demonstrated improved
performance on [maltreatment recurrence] from 2002 to 2005, compared to twenty-six
percent exhibiting a decline in performance (2009:iii-iv). It is important to note that this
report also states that the decline in numbers may have been impacted by “alternative
response” approaches to maltreatments and the accompanying allegations (2009: iv). In
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other words, since the inception of private agency care, there may have been a higher
rate of “screening out” or referral for family assessment, not necessarily requiring a
formal response or disposition of child abuse or maltreatment.
The authors of the report go on to state that “child maltreatment recurrence is
more likely to involve neglect than either physical or sexual abuse, a finding that is
supported by the results of multiple research efforts” (2009:iii). The implications of this
statement are that recurrence of child neglect is a more challenging problem for CPIs
and FSCs. Further, measurement of maltreatment recurrence rates does not
necessarily measure program success.
The assertion of neglect as a recurring paramount concern allows us to imagine
the correlation between child abuse and poverty. The Child Welfare League of America
reports that economic security and stability, proper nutrition, adequate housing, access
to proper healthcare and basic education are all social factors which impact poor
children (The Effects of Poverty on Child Well-Being; n.d.). And though none of these is
specifically an issue of child abuse or neglect, each of these issues factor into how
neglect can present itself in the home environment. It is possible that as a significant
number of child abuse cases involve recurring cases of neglect, CBCs may be in a
better position to assist locally than publicly administered, centralized programs.
Initiatives within the State of Florida to Privatize Family Safety Functions
The State of Florida’s basic model for dealing with issues of child abuse and
neglect is straightforward: calls are received by a central call center and screened by
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trained employees. If abuse or neglect is suspected, a report is initiated and is then sent
to the appropriate local (district or county level) child protective investigator (CPI). This
investigator may be a State of Florida employee or may be a private agency employee.
The suspected victim is required by the State Legislature to be seen within the first 24hours of receiving the call, and in instances where egregious abuse is suspected, must
be seen immediately upon receipt of the report. Once the CPI has completed the
investigation, several outcomes can occur. Either the report can be closed as
“unfounded;” the abuse can be verified and the child(ren) removed by court order with a
variety of potential outcomes to be achieved; or the child may remain in the home with
the case being transferred to a family services counselor (FSC), who will supervise the
child in the home while also initiating services to help ameliorate the issues that
surround the case. In the past, this entire process was implemented and managed by
the State of Florida Department of Children and Families (FDCF).
In the mid-1990s, the Florida Legislature mandated that the FDCF establish pilot
privatization programs:
Mid-2005
Transition to
CBC Complete 19 agencies in
Operation

1999-2000
3 Lead Agencies
in initial
Operation

Mid-1990s F.S.
409.1671
Establishes Pilot
Programs

1998
HB 3217
Directs DCF to
Privatize Foster
Care by 2003

Early-2000s
Eleven Lead
Agencies in
Operation

Figure 1: Privatization Timeline
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The task of privatization would happen by contracting family safety services with
community based care (CBC) agencies (Progress Report January 2003). In 1997, the
US Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), which included
guidance to strengthen states’ efforts to protect vulnerable children by emphasizing the
safety of children as the paramount concern of child welfare service agencies. By 2000,
the State of Florida’s Legislature had expanded the privatization effort, and required the
FDCF to establish a test region which would provide services through CBCs. In early
2003, Florida’s child protection programs, including the test regions, were reviewed by
the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability (OPPAGA). The
2003 report pinpoints some issues with some counties which privatized early. Some of
the more pressing issues include untimely responses to child abuse calls; not seeing
victims face-to-face as required by State Statute; inability to prevent reoccurrences of
child abuse and neglect; neglecting to provide safe, permanent and stable living
arrangements; and high turnover of employees (nearly one in four family service
counselors terminate employment with the State within the first year).
Pilot projects proved difficult to administer, and two had their contracts
terminated (OPPAGA Progress Report 2003). The OPPAGA saw significant limitations
and flaws within the privatization initiative and recommended that the State revise the
applicable Florida Statutes to allow for more flexibility at the community level. The
suggested changes to the Statute were implemented by the State Legislature; however,
it was noted that there was still a lack of data, and program efficiency could not be
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evaluated (OPPAGA Progress Report 2003). In addition, the OPPAGA identified two
significant issues seemingly outside of anyone’s control: the lack of a lead community
agency to step in and take over child protection functions in a given area, and the local
community’s reluctance to allow private agency administration of child protection
functions due to the FDCF functioning smoothly in that local region.
Even as recently as 2006, the OPPAGA has determined that many of the lead
agencies in Florida are found to be in non-compliance with their contracts (2006: 8).
Further, the OPPAGA asserts that FDCF has not been punishing those agencies in
many cases. In some cases, the non-compliance has been found to be repeated, and
still many times, FDCF fails to take action (8). In the 2006 report, which examines data
from FY 2003-4 and FY 2005-6, the actual numbers of violations in several key areas
increased substantially.
According to an OPPAGA (2001:55-56) review, more than half of the states in
the union were, at that time, in various stages of privatization utilizing myriad
approaches. This decentralization of process and procedure makes it difficult to assess
program efficacy, however, the avenues chosen by the State of Kansas have somewhat
matched those of the State of Florida. Kansas began privatization efforts earlier than did
Florida. There have been some issues with the implementation and management of
Kansas’ programs over time. The main issues surrounding Kansas’ privatization
initiatives include cost overruns (based on unrealistic or inaccurate estimates), high staff
turnover and inexperience, and inadequate training of employees. All of these factors
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have contributed to mixed client outcomes. A recent report from the Florida Coalition for
Children in fact touched on many of the same measures, requesting several millions of
dollars to be infused into several child welfare arenas within the State of Florida,
including an additional $16.6 million to augment the “funding for child welfare worker
salaries in order to provide workforce stability” (Cusick 2009:1).
In Brevard County, while child protective investigators (CPIs) remain State
employees and still fall under the direct purview of the FDCF, family services counselors
(FSC) are employed by contracted private agencies who report to the Brevard Family
Partnership (BFP), the lead agency charged with the provision of child safety measures
in Brevard County. BFP was established in 2003 as “a non-profit organization in
response to the Legislative mandate to privatize foster care and related services… the
Agency was subsequently awarded the contract, through the Florida Department of
Children and Families, to manage Brevard County’s child welfare system” (BFP of
Brevard 2009). A recent name change from Community Based Care of Brevard (CBCB)
to Brevard Family Partnership was intended to highlight the shift in focus of community
based care ideals away from “bureaucracy for bureaucracy’s sake” and toward
strengthening the family unit by encouraging cooperation between agency personnel
and clients. Each county in the State of Florida has instituted its own model of
community based care, some with more success than others. Highlighting the various
ways in which private agencies can administer family safety programs, there have been
two primary models of delivery. One (which is the BFP model) provides for a central
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agency which manages and oversees the functions of other contracted service
providers. Contracted service providers employ caseworkers and field personnel and
report back to the central agency, who in turn reports to the FDCF. The second usurps
all roles, including administration and field operations and reports directly to the FDCF.
In general, privatization efforts in the State of Florida have encompassed a broad
array of functions, from prison facility building and maintenance to toll-booth
management to environmental protection agency tasks to family safety initiatives. The
results of privatization efforts are mixed, with some privatization initiatives being too new
to draw meaningful comparisons and with others, for example, the State of Florida
Environmental Protection Agency preliminarily showing some promise (OPPAGA 2005).
Florida has long been at the forefront of state privatization efforts, with strong
state-level and federal support. Former Florida Department of Management Services
Secretary Bill Simon has been quoted as saying the “timing [is] right for an outsourcing
revolution” in the state of Florida (as qtd. in Segal 2004). Drawbacks however have
been noted, and among the most challenging problems are related to a common
analysis which can help to illustrate the efficacy of private agencies functioning within a
state bureaucracy. Because each contracted agency is able to have its own hierarchy,
processes and procedures, making meaningful comparisons across agencies difficult. In
addition, cost savings have been called into question.
Florida Statutes direct the OPPAGA to “complete a program evaluation and
justification review of each state agency that is operating under a performance-based
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budget” (Justification Review December 2001). These OPPAGA reviews serve several
purposes, including assessment of performance measures and standards, evaluation of
agency performance, and identification of whether or not a program could be more
efficiently administered by government or private entity (Justification Review December
2001). Some agencies, when reviewed by the OPPAGA, fare better than others. For
example, The State Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has worked well
under privatization initiatives, and in the past the OPPAGA has recommended that
additional DEP functions be privatized.
Conversely, in some regions of the State, child safety functions have been
problematic at various times and in various stages of the privatization process. In the
past year, the lead contracted agency in Orange and Osceola Counties, Family
Services of Metro Orlando (FSMO) has been replaced during an open bidding session
by Community Based Care of Seminole, giving the latter agency control over three
central Florida counties. While Community Based Care of Seminole has declared that
the administration of functions in Orange County will remain a fully-staffed separate
entity from Seminole County, some question if the “tri-county” model can be effective at
the local level, and whether it mirrors some of the problems that a larger agency might
have regarding responding to local concerns (Santich 2010).
In addition to the privatization and decentralization of child safety functions,
Chapter 2006-30 of the State of Florida Laws provides for additional outsourcing of
program oversight. This means that not only have contracts been awarded to private
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agencies to care for abused and neglected children, but also contracts were in the offing
for the State to further distance itself from the administrative duties of monitoring those
private agencies which had already been awarded contracts. According to a report from
the OPPAGA, the “pilot project transfers fiscal, administrative, and program monitoring
responsibilities from the Department of Children and Families to independent, nongovernmental third-party oversight entities” (Outsourced Oversight for CommunityBased Care 2003:1-2).
While there were several setbacks during the implementation phase of the pilot
project, overall it was reported that the project “helped the department and lead
agencies improve their quality assurance, quality improvement and performance
measurement systems,” however, it also created “several challenges for the
department” (Outsourced Oversight for Community-Based Care 2003:2). Chapin Hall,
an independent child welfare research institute attached to the University of Chicago,
was contracted to conduct preliminary program monitoring and to assist in the
development of new performance measures. Initially some discrepancies were found
between the reports of the pilot lead agencies and the final reports of Chapin Hall, but
ultimately, these disagreements led the state to improve its quality assurance system
(Outsourced Oversight for Community-Based Care 2003:3).
Interestingly, the relationship between the state and Chapin Hall appeared to be
one which benefitted all concerned parties, yet the OPPAGA recommended that the
pilot oversight program be terminated due to “several ongoing challenges” (Outsourced
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Oversight for Community-Based Care 2003:5). Some of the challenges cited include a
weakening of the relationship between the FDCF and the contracted agents which
ultimately reduced the FDCF’s ability to understand the intricacies of each individual
agency, a reduction of the FDCF’s control and oversight, and a lack of agencies which
can perform child welfare program monitoring (the OPPAGA report states that Chapin
Hall lacked expertise in specific, essential types of case file reviews). This last challenge
was significant: it effectively allowed the few agencies engaging in this type of work to
set prices outside of the range that the FDCF was willing or able to pay. In January of
2009, George H. Sheldon, Secretary of the FDCF, concurred with the recommendations
of the OPPAGA, and the program was terminated with the exception of a few very
limited pilot program functions Chapin Hall would continue to monitor for an undisclosed
amount of time (Outsourced Oversight for Community-Based Care 2003:7). To date, the
FDCF continues to monitor the bulk of the lead agencies’ performance in the State of
Florida.
Effectively, the jury is still out regarding privatization of child safety programs in
Florida. Overall, child abuse and neglect rates continue to be problematic, as does the
yearly draw on State funding. Is child safety an issue on which a dollar sign can be
placed? Is it possible that a budget can be set which adequately serves the needs of
each and every (known) member of this vulnerable population? These questions
plagued the FDCF and will likely remain bothersome to contracted service providers.
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To help clarify, it is important to understand the types of clients that the agency
and its workers are likely to serve.
How Inequality Plays a Role

Sociologists concentrate their research with regard to inequality under the
umbrella of “class, race, and gender.” It has been asserted that these three factors
intersect to help shape and define what social inequality is in America. What is perhaps
more interesting is that nearly a century of social policy aimed at these groups has not
helped to level the playing field; rather, it may have helped to perpetuate unequal
treatment and stereotypes. Intriguing is the idea that politicians, thanks to social
scientists, now have the ability to accurately gauge public sentiment and opinion to craft
their rhetoric to fit the mood of the American people (Skocpol 1994). Okongwu and
Mechner (2000:110) explain that “[i]deology and public policy are critically linked” and
Katz (2000:118) sums up that “[i]t has been politics, of course, much more than social
science that has shaped America’s welfare state…”.
Dating as far back as the late 1800s, there was acknowledgement of the link
between public sentiment and social policy, as Jane Addams (1893:1) expressed it,
“The policy of the public authorities of never taking an initiative, and always waiting to
be urged to do their duty, is fatal…” Reflecting on the plight of Blacks in America in the
year 1900, W.E.B. Du Bois (1978:282) wrote, “In political life we had… been
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disenfranchised by violence, law and public opinion.” Today, just as in the past,
politicians understand they have to react to public sentiment.
In recent decades, politicians have had a much more sensitive and accurate
method with which to measure public sentiment—the field of public opinion research.
With regard to public opinion and inequality then, we must ask, how does public opinion
shape social policy with regard to social welfare?
As Christopher Jencks (1992:23) points out there is one serious flaw that must
be noted with respect to allowing public opinion to influence the shaping of public policy
discourse and welfare reform, and that is that the public are not always the best
indicator of the “real” consequences of being poor in America; nor should they have the
sole job of influencing politicians or shaping public policy toward the poor. The
government and elected officials must take some responsibility in shaping how the
public view the poor, and in assisting the public in understanding what programs and
policies might be best. At issue are the long term consequences of well-thought (or
poorly crafted) ways to ameliorate social problems.
The idea that a societal safety net is needed for working parents is not new
(Shaw 2007). In the United States, dating back to the early 1900’s, the work of Jane
Addams argues for an American welfare state which could address the many social
problems that were forming in urban areas:
It is constantly said that because the masses have never had social
advantages they do not want them… This divides a city into rich and poor; into
the favored, who express their sense of the social obligation by gifts and money,
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and into the unfavored, who express it by clamoring for a “share”—both of them
actuated by a vague sense of justice (Addams 1914:2).
From her feminist roots, Addams further argues that since a social welfare net
would primarily benefit women by helping to ameliorate care-giving tasks, then it would
also make sense for women to benefit by moving into the public sphere (Kivisto
2003:166). At the same time that Addams was making her statements about women
and the welfare state, Du Bois was highlighting “the need to anchor research on poverty
and the welfare state (as well as on race) in history” (Katz 2000:116).
As Lindsley (2004:201) states, “social reformers during the Great Depression
struggled to alter dysfunctional social arrangements…. Bold and imaginative leadership
was called for.” In the aftermath of the Great Depression, our political leaders stepped
forward with a sweeping plan to help the country out of the crippling grip of an ailing and
dysfunctional economy and to set the country on the path to recovery—a plan which
garnered strong support from the public. According to Katz (2000:116), welfare policy
was crafted from Elizabethan poor laws, and instituted itself in the form of almshouses,
reformatories, orphanages and the like. By the 1930s, social insurance had entered the
picture, and by the end of WWII, employers and unions had worked together to form the
basic structure of a private welfare state.
For sixty years, from the end of the Great Depression until the mid ‘90s, the
United States had a welfare entitlement program embedded in the Social Security Act—
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). During the gendered and racial social
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shifts that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the nation’s welfare rolls
dramatically increased and the proportion of children covered skyrocketed (Corcoran et.
al, 2000), leading to a shift in public sentiment about the government’s role in welfare
concerns and to the eventual dismantling of AFDC in favor of current reforms. This shift,
which took nearly half a century to complete, took the administration of our federal
welfare programs from public to private and coupled them with increasing
decentralization and retrenchment which occurred en masse in the latter part of the
twentieth century. As this shift gained momentum, it became increasingly more difficult
(with regard to making comparative sense of aggregate level data) for researchers to
accurately determine the ability of myriad local, state, and federal programs to help
people move off of welfare rolls toward more stable, long-term economic positions.
Schram (2005:254), in response to Morgen and O’Connor, now calls for “new
poverty research that goes beyond the limitations of mainstream methodologies by
recognizing the normative standards implicit in statistical measurements.” Morgen and
O’Connor argue for less aggregation of data, and more localized case studies which will
expose successes and failures rather than mask them in potentially skewed norms. To
clarify, Schram argues for an increased role for research interpretations at a more
intimate level while pulling back on isolated empirical findings. As an example,
Reintsma makes just one small assertion here of how difficult aggregating data would
become with the decentralization of welfare programs:
…among the major recurring issues in the US are the increase in the
number of single parent families, who comprise a significant proportion of welfare
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recipients, the perpetuation of welfare dependency from one generation to the
next, and concern about the development of an underclass… In addition to these
universal issues, specific issues that have gained prominence in the US as a
result of the most recent welfare legislation include the definition of welfare
caseloads… (Reintsma 2007:1)
Without agreement on a concept as essential as what determines a worker’s
caseload, it is easy to see why meaningful aggregate measurements under existing
welfare reforms would prove to be challenging. Indeed, perhaps this complexity works in
favor of the decentralization of welfare programs—if we cannot agree on what “welfare”
is, then how can we examine whether current reforms may or may not be effective?
My research will assist in clarifying new mandates, procedures and definitions by
examining local level actions to establish a sort of “baseline” of the new model of care in
Brevard County, Florida. This is an essential first step if there is to be any subsequent
meaningful comparative analysis among agencies and states.
Welfare Policy and Intersections with Race, Class and Gender
While understandings about our welfare system are not just about race, class or
gender, none of these can be extricated from the study of welfare policy. Korpi suggests
that we often forget that:
…class was a central concept for thinkers as different as Emile Durkheim,
Karl Marx, and Max Weber. The class concept is however, controversial and is
used in several different ways. It is thus often conceived in terms of membership
in groups with which individuals indentify and the specific subcultures and norms
of such groups. A more fruitful research approach is to define class in nominal
terms as categories of individuals who share relatively similar positions, or
situations, in employment relations and on labor markets (2008:8).
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Indeed, “the welfare debate in the United States is both gendered and highly
racialized” (Hudson and Couros 2005:19). Relying on the work of Sklar, Orloff (1996:60)
states that historically “in the United States, gender substituted for class as the
organizing principle of welfare politics as organized middle-class women played the role
of welfare champions elsewhere undertaken by organized labor and working-class
parties.” Morgen and Maskovsky (2003:328-29) report that “class analysis is
conspicuously absent in much of the literature on welfare” where the foci of analyses
have been on definitions of caseloads rather that the reduction of poverty; they assert
that researchers must understand “that US urban poverty is produced by the dynamics
of class under advanced capitalism, combined with the… mutual constitution of gender,
race and class relations.”
Myles and Quadagno (2000:158) state that “The postwar welfare state was
designed for the male breadwinner family model, to protect families against the
catastrophic risks of the sole provider losing his job due to unemployment, illness, or old
age.” In other words, “treating men as workers… and women as “mothers” entitled to
welfare benefits” (Morgen and Maskovksy 2003:322). Partly in response to the radically
changing roles of women in the mid-part of the twentieth century, welfare rolls shifted by
gender, with women beginning to make up the highest percentage of recipients. In
today’s American society, over “30 percent of families with children are headed by one
parent, almost always a woman” (Ellwood 2000:188).

60

The structural forces of wage parity, routing of women into “pink-collar” jobs, and
bearing the brunt of child rearing activities and home-maker duties all play a part in how
single women arrived in this ‘place.’ Prior to the second wave, women were in a place of
extreme marginalization in American society. Hacker (1951:67) succinctly states that
women were “torn between rejection and acceptance of traditional roles and attributes.
Uncertain of the ground on which she stands, subjected to conflicting cultural
expectations, the marginal women suffers the psychological ravages of instability,
conflict, self-hate, anxiety and resentment.” If this was the plight of every woman, it is
not difficult to envision how poor women might have been stereotyped. Stuck between
their subservient status and a childlike persona that had been crafted as a byproduct of
patriarchy, women were viewed as less than: less than men and less than adult. This
view was to linger and the remnants can still be readily found in the workplace and the
home, and more importantly to this analysis, in social welfare policy. Not until the 1960s
did women begin to really challenge their positions and roles, and for that, they would
be put in their place by even more pointed policy restrictions and social stereotypes.
Socially, the shifts in how the public perceived poor women began to foment in
the radical ‘60s, serving to undermine “the public perception of the “deserving” status of
single mothers” (Ellwood 2000:188). Ellwood points out that in single parent families,
poverty rates still exceed 40 percent, and that “worker support policies still fail to
address the biggest underlying source of poverty and insecurity of single parent
families: the family must generally rely on the earnings of one person—typically a low-
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skilled woman—for support (2000:195). Orloff (1996:51) writes, “Gender relations—
embodied in the sexual division of labor… gendered forms of citizenship and political
participation, ideologies of masculinity and femininity and the like—profoundly shape the
character of welfare states” and for her, “welfare states reinforced pre-existing… gender
roles and relations” (1996:54). Particularly hard hit are poor women of color, with
emerging empirical research showing that “communities of color have been
disproportionately and most negatively affected by the new welfare policies” (Morgen
and Maskovsky 2003:330)
Recalling the “poverty to perversity” theme, we can see how it has served to
challenge and change the way most Americans see the poor not only in light of
gendered relations, but also with respect to ideas and prejudices about race. Relying on
the work of Abramovitz (1996), Orloff (1996), and Kingfisher (2002), Morgen and
Maskovsky (2003:322) assert that “persistent patterns of “welfare racism” reinforce(s)
racial hierarchies and redefine(s) the terms of citizenship to exclude poor families of
color even from… meager protections.” Schram (2005:261) is more direct: “welfare has
historically operated so as not to undermine the racial regime of white-dominated
America.”
While prior to reforms poor people of color had been viewed as a group who had
been disadvantaged due to their place in society, by the mid-twentieth century point,
most Americans had begun to view poor people of color as individuals who had
somehow managed to have great influence over their place in society—who had made
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bad decisions which led to their place in society. The focus shifted from structural
problems within our society which primarily contributed to a loss of opportunity to a view
that individual poor people had made poor choices that landed them in the poorhouse.
Welfare, for many Americans who did not need it:
…carried a stigma: those who receive it have failed as individuals and are
a burden on society. And that stigma has a color. The welfare state is literally
colored by the “black, welfare-dependent underclass, which serves as a pillar of
the American cultural imagination [expressing] assumptions about the meaning
of both “welfare” and “black”… The specter of the black welfare-dependent
underclass has greatly affected society’s relationship to all African Americans
and to all welfare recipients (Poole 2006:2).
Bane (n.p.:20) asserts that “It may be worth suggesting… that the problem of
poverty and the problem of race, though related are distinct. Poverty is not a condition
that affects only racial minorities. And [racism] is a legacy that our society ought to be
working to overcome even if it were not causally implicated in poverty.
As conservative political interests gained a strong foothold in the Reagan era,
(and again with the election of George W. Bush), scholars “posited race as the
underlying determinant of partisan division” (Philpot, 2004:254, relying on the works of
Campbell, 1977; Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld, 1989, and
Frymer, 1999). What Philpot and others assert is that race is also a factor with regard to
the direction of social policy. Schram (2005:254) states that “by the 1960s welfare came
to be seen as a “black program,” making it politically vulnerable” as calls for its
contraction came in the 1990s. Morgen and Maskovsky (2004:318) assert that since
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1998, “welfare receipt has become increasingly concentrated in urban centers,
particularly among people of color.”
As earlier asserted, policy feedback theory tells us that government policies are
not crafted in a vacuum; rather they are the result of a tautological relationship between
what the public think and what politicians want them to think. Recent studies are
indicative that race matters when crafting welfare policy, as it has been shown that there
is a relationship between states adoption of “get tough” welfare reforms and the racial
composition of their welfare population (Schram 2004:259). Theorizing along these lines
and in light of welfare reforms would allow us to see how poor inner-city neighborhoods
have become increasingly “encapsulated worlds” (Morgen and Maskovsky 2004:318).
It does not seem to matter that the view of the “average” welfare recipient was
(and continues to be) flawed (Hudson and Coukos 2005:19-20). While Blacks are
disproportionately represented in the welfare rolls, the overwhelming numbers of
welfare recipients are White. Coupled with the remains of racism and sexism, this public
attitude served to open the door for a change in political rhetoric.
Relying on the work of Burbridge, Dalla Costa, Dalla Costa and Seavey,
Okongwu and Mechner (2000:111) state that, “[e]conomically vulnerable families
experience the most deleterious effects of economic restructuring and structural
adjustment policies.” As evidence for their assertions, the authors point to emerging
research with supports the recent divergence of incomes among poor African American
and White women after having held steady for decades. Schram (2005:253) points to an
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increasing body of research which supports this notion, revealing “racial disparities in
client treatment outcomes: whites are leaving welfare faster than blacks; among those
leaving, blacks are more likely to be forced off welfare; blacks are more likely to exhaust
their time allowed on welfare; and blacks are more likely to cycle back on welfare after
having left.”
Further, as Beller and Hout (2006:20) point out, when inequality is great, social
mobility matters a lot. The advantages of rising to the top are large, and the
consequences of remaining stuck at the bottom are much more serious.” This is
certainly evidence for the continued subservience of women (both white and non-white)
in American society; there may also be evidence for the failings of our retrenched
welfare policies. In addition to the divergence of African American and White women’s
incomes, there continues to be evidence that women and men are systemically
regarded differently within the institution of the workforce. According to the most recent
American Community Survey (ACS) report, women earn on average about 77.5 percent
of what men earn in the US (2007:12).
Perhaps the most important part of the puzzle of the “poverty of perversity”
theme is its intersection with race and gender. Poverty rates vary quite drastically by
race in America, with a range of about eight percent (for Whites) to about 24 percent
(for African Americans) (Bane and Zenteno 2005). Further, as is historically supported,
the gender picture is skewed in favor of men. Single women with children experience
poverty at higher rates than families with two parents, or than families with a male head
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of household (Bane and Zenteno 2005). Myriad scholars and researchers assert that
the “legacy of racial stigma in the US that dates from slavery persists in stereotyping
and discrimination” which persists even with the passage of civil rights laws (Bane and
Zenteno n.p.:27; Bane n.p.). This makes African American and Hispanic women
especially vulnerable, as they fight the impacts of “double jeopardy.”
Clearly with an examination of contemporary theory coupled with the ways in
which policy shapes the realities of all segments of society, the debate about welfare in
America is going to be a perpetual swing of the ideological pendulum. Ideas, whether
from the political left or right, ostensibly attempt to level the playing field—it should be
obvious however that the jury is out with regard to the efficacy of current reforms. As
Bane (2005:9) points out, “Since 1996, welfare reform has been successful in
dramatically reducing welfare rolls and increasing employment of single mothers; it has
been less successful in reducing poverty.” It will take several years yet to gather enough
data to support or refute the successes of decentralization, retrenchment and
privatization. Moreover, it may take generations to fully and clearly understand the
legacy of contemporary welfare reform.
I believe that race, class and gender have played a subtle but important role with
regard to privatization. While it is not likely that these three social factors were a direct
motivation for privatization of child safety functions, I assert that these underlying
themes were (and continue to be) in the background with regard to policymaker
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decisions and served to extend the distance between the state and private entities and
to open the door to thinking about privatization of this essential branch of social welfare.
Local Efforts to Privatize Family Safety

As privatization approached in Brevard County, I was offered a position with one
of the agencies sub-contracted to BFP (then CBCB). While initially I was interested in
the position, I eventually felt that going back to school to work on my graduate degree
was the right decision. I did not accept the position. In retrospect, the pilot program that
had been running in Brevard County for the two years prior to the full-on dismantling of
FDCF had been doing a good job at staying afloat, but it simply wasn’t interesting to me.
I had been a long-time public servant, and I wanted to continue on working for a state or
government entity of some sort. My decision to return to school was a regrouping of
sorts.
Further, I had friends and associates who had been working in the pilot, and
while they seemed content at their jobs, there were notable differences. Where the state
was paying us to work overtime hours, my colleagues working in the pilot weren’t
allowed to work any hours over forty. This seemed problematic to me as I could not see
how to do the job with such a constraint. This is not to say that a forty hour work week
was not possible; rather, that it wasn’t probable.
My average caseload as a FSC tended toward twenty cases. It’s important to
note that the number of cases is not equivalent to the number of children in care on a
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particular worker’s caseload. With each case, I may only have one child in the home, or
I may have several. The largest case I worked was a blended family with eight children,
ranging from toddler-aged to teen-aged.
The primary functions of my job were two-fold. I was charged, of course, with the
safety of the children on my caseload, but the daily functions of my job were primarily to
see the children in the field at least once a month, and to manage the paperwork and
court proceedings for each case. While these seem relatively simple tasks, the weeks
flew by with few dull moments.
Rarely did I visit a family only once a month. While state statutes only required
me to do so, I regularly saw my families at least twice a month. My feeling about this
was that once a month was not frequent enough to establish the rapport that I needed
to build with a family. While not the norm, I did have a few families on my caseload that
required me to visit more frequently, and for those cases, I tried to visit at least once a
week. I also often visited with other service providers in their offices (such as other
counselors, parenting paraprofessionals, etc.) for status reports.
Home visits most often lasted for about one hour, with some on the short side of
that figure, and others that would last for at least two to three hours. My cases were
from the north end of Brevard County to the south, and because of the geography of
Brevard County, having a case on the north end of the county meant that I would have
to clear my schedule for an entire afternoon just to make a home visit for one case. I
also had occasion to have to travel to several other counties in the state for children on
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my caseload that were placed with relatives. At times, I had children placed in Orlando,
Crystal River, Vero Beach, and Miami. On one occasion, I traveled to Tennessee to
retrieve an infant from a “blown” relative placement. Situations like these, outside of the
control of the worker, served to complicate schedules for several days afterward as new
placements had to be found, medical appointments had to be made and children had to
be enrolled in new schools.
Demographics of the Region and County
Brevard County, in its current shape, was established in 1905. With over seventy
miles of coast, it is a long, narrow county, located centrally on the state of Florida’s east
coast. Covered with marshes and wetlands to the west and waterways and beaches to
the east, local, state and federal government have worked in conjunction with regard to
preservation efforts. A series of man-made canals assist with drainage and were utilized
by settlers for transportation, linking to the St. John’s River, one of the state’s most
traveled waterways.
The county is generally divided into three regions: the north, central Brevard and
the south. Populations are unevenly dispersed, with the northern region of the county
growing at a much slower rate than the center and the south.
Approximately half a million people live in Brevard County, which ranks it tenth in
the state. According to most recent Census data (2010), the racial composition of
Brevard does not accurately reflect the racial composition of the United States:
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Brevard County
White

United States

85%

69%

Black or African American 10%

14%

Hispanic

4%

12%

Other

1%

4%

The economy of Brevard County relies on tourism, the space industry, and the
military as some of the primary employers. “Snowbirds” are common, with a significant
percentage of the population comprised of retirees who spend only part of the year in
the county. According to an article in the local edition of the Florida Today newspaper,
in 2007 roughly 30% of the population was over the age of 55 (Kim 2007), and the
county, as does the United States, continues on a “graying” trend.
According to the Kiplinger Review, Brevard County is a better than average place
for seniors to retire, with an abundance of affordable housing, doctors and services for
retirees. However, for the second year in a row, Forbes magazine rated the Central
Florida area as the worst in which to find a job, with property values rapidly falling and a
collapsing real estate market (Walker 2012).
The county seat for Brevard County is at the northern end of the county, in
Titusville, but most of the population of the county is in the southern end, toward the
fast-growing cities of Palm Bay and Viera. In the past, this often meant a 50-plus mile
drive to conduct business at the county seat. This had been a logistical issue for county
government, until the county commission decided to accommodate the south with the
addition of a county courthouse annex in the city of Viera. Government services are no
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longer centralized to the Titusville location; rather they are spread out among many
locations county-wide. Politically, Brevard tends to lean more conservative than liberal,
as evidenced not only by the graying population, but also by inclusion in a “Republican”
state. The last six Presidential elections have seen Brevard County vote for Republican
as opposed to Democratic candidates, and the Governor’s office has been held by
Republicans since 1999.
How Family Safety Looked Then and How it Looks Now

It is important to understand the process of how a suspected instance of child
abuse was/is handled by the state as well as understanding how it is now handled by
BFP. While there are many similarities in the current and former models, some
significant differences exist.
Processes that Remain Intact with Privatization
As with pre-privatization, cases of suspected child abuse are still phoned into a
centralized facility using a toll-free number. In the state of Florida, there are two
classifications of groups which are required to report suspected cases of child abuse:
mandated reporters and professionally mandated reporters. Mandated reporters are
defined as every person in the state of Florida who suspects a child is being abused or
neglected. Professionally mandated reporters are those in specific occupations who are
required by Florida law to report suspected cases of abuse or neglect (Reporting Abuse
of Children and Vulnerable Adults 2009-2010). Examples of professionally mandated
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reporters include teachers, firefighters, doctors and nurses, and law enforcement
professionals.
Suspected cases are phoned into the abuse hotline (1-800-96-ABUSE) where it
is determined whether a case can or should be initiated. The workers at the abuse
hotline facility are trained by the same agencies that train field workers and therefore
have a solid foundational understanding of the criteria required to open a case. Once a
case is opened, it is classified as an “immediate” or “normal” case and subsequently
channeled to the local FDCF CPI office where an investigator is assigned. For
immediate response cases, a four hour window is allotted for the investigator to make
contact with the victim. In normal cases (normal meaning cases which are not
considered life-threatening or egregious), a 24 response is required by statute. A CPI
has this period of time to make contact with their victim and to commence the case.
For the last several years (pre- and post-privatization), most responses in
Brevard County have been classified at the local level as “immediate” response cases—
even when not classified as such as the state hotline facility—for myriad reasons. This
means that Brevard County CPIs have only four hours in which to make contact with
their victims. This reclassification is also a prime example of Lipsky’s (2000)
examination of street-level bureaucracy as this reinterpretation of the state mandate
places extreme demands on the local field worker.
Differences in the Models
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The most significant difference with regard to delivery of services is the diversion
program titled CARES. BFP set up the CARES program as a voluntary prevention
program centered on reduction of children entering foster care via a prevention protocol.
Families are encouraged to actively participate in the program, working on building their
parenting skills and on increasing the family unit’s stability (Brevard CARES).
The CARES protocol is new to Brevard County, having been instituted with
privatization. CARES is unique in that the focus is on the family’s strengths as opposed
to the administrative needs of the agency. In essence, where FDCF caseworkers were
very strongly encouraged to work from a predetermined list of services which may have
loosely fit a particular family dynamic, the CARES program tailors its approach to the
individual family and their specific needs. What is the same as past models is the need
to show success by outcomes.
The CARES program has, by many accounts, been very successful in Brevard
County. CARES is a service which provides a centralized location for parents to access
wide-ranging community supports and services. CPIs and other professionals involved
in the family safety area are also able to make referrals for families in need. Involvement
with the CARES program lasts from three to six months, and participation is voluntary,
meaning that a family can sever the service relationship at any time. CARES uses what
is called a “Wraparound-Family Team Conferencing” approach, and the primary goal is
to allow children to remain in their own homes while working with families to maintain

73

child safety; CARES focus is family strengthening which moves the family toward longterm sustainability.
According to BFP’s Performance Review for the third quarter of 2010 (July,
August and September of 2010, which is the most recent data published on the BFP
website), the CARES program took in 465 referrals.
The CARES program is significantly different that the previous FDCF staffing
model in that CARES is centered on family participation. Former FDCF models did not
require—and often did not seek out—family participation. This speaks to the inflexibility
of a top-down model whereby state level mandates are carried out at the local level
regardless of their efficacy.
The Emergence of an Agency

BFP was created in 2003 as a response to the state’s requirements to privatize
family safety at the local level. They were contracted to manage Brevard County’s child
welfare system and are charged with oversight of other community agencies and the
Brevard County Government.
According to information provided on the BFP website, the agency has
“consistently ranked among the top performing CBCs in the state of Florida, ranking
among the top three agencies over the course of the past five years in visits to children
and families, timely reunification, and exceeding the federal measures for placement
stability” The site goes on to assert that “[s]ince the advent of Brevard Family
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Partnership, and the implementation of family centered case practice using the
wraparound process, Brevard County’s child safety has increased by nearly 50%.”
BFP is governed by a board of directors who volunteer to serve. The board is
comprised of retirees and professionals from the local area, and it appears that most
have some sort of ties to the welfare of children. The executive staff of BFP is made up
of five individuals, all of whom have significant years of service within the child safety
and welfare arenas within the United States. As the agency has aged, the organization
has become more complex and more bureaucratic (Appendix C). Dr. Patricia Nellius is
the CEO of BFP, and has been since the creation of the agency. She holds a Doctorate
in Counseling and has worked in myriad child and family serving agencies in her 25
years of experience in this area. Her vision has been instrumental in the creation and
implementation of BFP, and she has been recognized by several national, state, and
local entities for her work in family safety/child welfare.
Gatekeepers and Street-Level Bureaucrats
Doing a good job every day was, at best, a tenuous attempt. The best part of the
job was the interaction I had with the overwhelming majority of families who were able
to heal and progress over time. However due to many additional duties and
responsibilities placed on me by my supervisors, systematic mandates and the courts,
the best part of the job was also the part that was most often overlooked due to other
responsibilities. As I recalled, I was required to see the children on my caseload at least
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once a month in the field (meaning, for the most part, in their homes). I am proud to say
that I never had a delinquency on my caseload in that respect.
What I did wish for however was extra time—extra time to complete the other
tasks that had to be done every day, and extra time to do additional home visits. As we
often were allowed to work overtime hours, for my most difficult cases, I could generally
visit more than once a month. If not for that overtime, I doubt I would have been able to
work those second and third visits into a forty hour work week.
In 1980, Michael Lipsky wrote Street Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the
Individual in Public Services. His analysis is a detailed account of how applications of
administrative mandates are handled at the street-level. He asserts that state and local
level politicians will look to street-level bureaucrats to tighten social services budgets
(159). As Lipsky explains, the public deserves accountability from public workers, and
as accountability efforts increase, decentralization is bound to also increase. I assert
that privatization is a product of decentralization; it does not however sever the
relationship of accountability—it simply moves it to another venue. As we move from a
centralized agency model to a decentralized and localized structure, the ability to
reinterpret and modify state mandates becomes easier. With easier local
reinterpretations, it may become less cumbersome for new local agencies to emerge
and subsequently do their jobs. One initial focus of privatization was that it would equal
responsiveness in the local community. With a less obvious path for centralized
government oversight, the potential for privatization increases.
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To apply Lipsky’s work in my research, it is not difficult to envision the
privatization of family safety as a sort of barrier to accountability at the state level. As
the FDCF budget was growing each year, turning over the reins to private agency care
was attractive. Not only did this stretch the distance between the public and private work
spheres, this decentralization created a high level of local anonymity for these new
private, local agencies. Where, for decades, people knew “the Lady from DCF” (the
name we were most commonly given in the field by clients and their neighbors), now
they knew someone was coming to their home, but they weren’t quite sure who this
person was or for whom they worked. In the space of one day, workers who had been
public employees with offices in a particular location were relocated, given new
supervisors, new offices, new telephone numbers, and in many cases, new caseloads.
They were no longer public employees. They were now private employees, hired by
several different agencies, all under the umbrella of BFP, which served the same
functions as the FDCF.
In addition to switching employers within a 24-hour period, many of the “rules of
the game” changed for caseworkers and supervisors. Workers who may have had years
of service with the state were now functioning under a different set of rules and
procedures. Where a particular set of criteria may have been applied in a certain way at
FDCF, now those criteria were being reevaluated and new applications were being
instituted. It is important to note here that the state statutes that dealt directly with child
abuse and family violence did not change, but the statutes driving privatization of family
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safety allowed for a less direct governmental role while increasing the power of smaller,
decentralized private agencies. This gave agencies increased control over how they
interpreted and followed state guidelines and mandates while also affording those
caseworkers a level of anonymity that working for the state could not provide.
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CHAPTER THREE: ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK AND
METHODOLOGY

The goals of this research are: to provide insight into the caseworkers’
perceptions of program effectiveness in a privatized climate; to explore worker attitudes
with regard to their performance limitations under new positional guidelines; and, to
make this research accessible and available to those who could potentially benefit from
my study. As such, I will examine mandates and organizational directives as a backdrop
for in-depth interviews.
My findings will provide a better awareness for program managers of caseworker
perspectives of their jobs, and will increase the amount of credible, reliable information
available to researchers regarding the issues surrounding privatization in the welfare
and family safety arena.
The Idea for the Project

The idea for this project came about when I began teaching as a graduate
teaching assistant in 2006. Prior to entering into the Ph.D. in Sociology program at the
University of Central Florida, I worked for several years as a Family Services Counselor
(FSC), and later as a FSC supervisor for the FDCF. In the classroom, my experience “in
the field” was invaluable; I was able to relate the work I had done to the theory,
concepts and ideas of sociology. In some respects, this brought to life the social
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problems which people were dealing with day-to-day in the backyard of the college
campus. Students responded well, and were engaged with my lecture materials and
were interested in the guest speakers who came to speak on a variety of family safety
issues. During my tenure as a graduate teaching assistant, I taught a variety of topics:
gender, domestic violence, drugs, social problems, and I was always able to explain the
“sociology” of the issue by giving examples of what I did on the job for the FDCF. The fit
between my job at the FDCF and my teaching life was a good one.
The decision to produce a dissertation on this area of study was not difficult to
imagine. Many associates from my days at the FDCF had gone on to work for the
private agencies in the local area, and my “heart” was still in the job of family safety. My
hopes were to provide something of substance that would be beneficial to vulnerable
populations in my own local area.
The unit in which I worked for the FDCF covered Brevard County, Florida, and
consisted of a full cadre of eight FSCs and one unit supervisor. Each FSC had an open
caseload that varied in size from a low of fifteen cases to a high of well over thirty
cases. It is important to note however that case size does not equal the raw number of
children for which a FSC is responsible. Since each case is a “family” unit and families
may have more than one child, the numbers of children for which each FSC was
responsible ranged from a low of fifteen to highs that reached well into the double digits.
The primary responsibility of the FSC was to take over the case from the Child
Protective Investigator (CPI) by providing extensive, ongoing services to the family. The
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FSC would work alongside the offending parent(s) or caregiver(s) and, if the child (or
children) was removed from the home, the FSC would work with the family with whom
the child was placed. The job of the FSC primarily consisted of “field work;” that is, the
bulk of the essential work for the job was done in the homes of the affected families,
assisting with referrals to service providers, listening to the issues that were plaguing
the family, and generally attempting to help the family find solutions to their problems.
While the primary role of the FSC was to help ameliorate the issues that brought
on the abuse or neglect of the child, the FSC became a sort of “Jill of All Trades.” On
any given day, I could find myself chauffeuring parents and children, taking frazzled
parents and toddlers to doctors appointments, testifying in court, cleaning a dirty home,
spending countless hours on the phone in attempts to find other NPOs to assist with the
particulars of a case, trying to help the unemployed (and often undereducated) to find a
job, on the floor playing with cars and dolls, teaching a new mother how to child-proof
her home, and the list goes on and on. My car became a toy shop of sorts, with coloring
books, crayons and inexpensive stuffed animals to keep children occupied while I
worked with parents. I had a file cabinet in my trunk with pamphlets titled “How to
Create a Safety Plan,” “What to do When Your Child Makes you Angry,” and “NEVER
Shake Your Baby!” The language of child abuse—contusions, immersion burns, spiral
bone fractures, digital penetration—became “normalized” to me, and conversations with
my peers should have been uncomfortable, but they were not.
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The job of the FSC was not a regular, forty-hour a week job. While we were
charged with a nine-to-five type of schedule, we rarely worked those hours. In effect, we
were hostage to the job we performed. Crises cropped up continually, and cell phones
rang at all hours and on all days. Holidays with our own families were often attended
while sitting on the edge of our seats, waiting for the phone to ring with a client’s call for
assistance. And, while this might sound like an impossible job, many of the
professionals with whom I worked were in love with their jobs. It was understood that
this was a “24/7, 365” job, and it was done without grumbling. When a colleague
needed time off, we covered those family visits, also. Ten-hour days were standard, and
if a case “blew up,” we worked well into the night, finding placements for children. It was
not unusual to find a FSC in the office in the middle of the night, with a child in tow,
making calls to foster homes to find someone willing to take in another child. Topping all
of this off were the court dates and the lengthy judicial reviews and shelter petitions
which had to be completed without fail. Entire productive field days could be lost with
one trip to the courthouse for one hearing on one case.
Rumors about what privatization would bring swirled for several years in Brevard
County before it actually came to be. There were pilot programs in the State which were
established many years prior to any movement toward private agency care in Brevard
County, and some of those pilots were plagued with problems which seemed at times to
be insurmountable. Privatization was well behind the original timeline which had been
envisioned by the FDCF. In Brevard County, FSCs were not sure what privatization
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would mean for their jobs. Would there be substantive changes to the roles that they
played? Would their jobs be different when directed and mandated by a private agency?
How would the transition take place? Would privatization be “better” or “worse” for them
and for the families they served?
By the time privatization did finally occur in Brevard County, I had left my position
with the FDCF to attend the Ph.D. program full-time. My ties to my FDCF coworkers
remained strong however and I made efforts to maintain those ties over the next several
years. Many of my colleagues have since climbed the ladder with the agencies to whom
they transitioned and are now in administrative positions.
Sample Characteristics

While I had originally hoped to be able to interview workers who were currently
employed with our lead agency and the two primary sub-contracted agencies which
employ caseworkers, approval to do so was not granted. Brevard Family Partnership
(BFP) is the parent agency which holds the State of Florida contract for administering
family safety functions in Brevard County. They in turn, contract to two primary
agencies, Devereux Florida, and Children’s Home Society (CHS) which employ the
former FDCF Family Services Counselors (FSC) in similar positions. These agencies’
positions are essentially similar and serve the same functions within the framework of
family safety in Brevard County.
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In December of 2009, I approached the CFO of BFP to discuss the parameters of
my research project. The initial focus of the project was to interview existing employees
of BFP, and of their subcontracted agencies. The CFO gave me verbal approval, and at
that time I proceeded with my proposal defense. Once the defense was approved in
early summer of 2010, I returned to BFP to obtain a letter of agreement, and at this time
the project was denied by the BFP Board of Trustees. In the span of time between my
initial contact and my request for a letter of approval (a few months), the procedure for
research requests with BFP had changed, and my project was subsequently evaluated
by the BFP Board of Trustees and denied.
After several meetings in mid- to late 2010, and after discussions with BFP CEO,
Dr. Patricia Nellius, it became clear that I would not be able to take the project in its
initial direction. While I was able to convince Dr. Nellius to allow me to proceed with my
project in a limited capacity with the approval of the agency, BFP wished to retain
control over all interviews conducted with their employees, and also wished to retain
control over my work product with the ability to redact/screen information prior to my
reporting it in this research. Their initial agreement entailed using their facility for
interviews, using their audio recording equipment, and allowing them to retain all work
products upon my exiting the property. I was not willing to allow such stringent
guidelines, and therefore, I decided to interview participants from outside of the purview
of BFP. Since the interviews would be conducted with participants who did not work for
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BFP, I would retain personal control over the content of the interviews. This however
would severely limit the numbers of participants I would go on to interview.
Nonetheless, a working relationship was established with BFP and we were able
to come to some agreement about some limited involvement on their part and what that
would entail. First, instead of recruiting interviewees from within the BFP hierarchy, my
interviews were conducted with individuals who were not known by me to be currently
employed by BFP. Secondly, I agreed to share my findings with BFP prior to completion
of the project so that they could have the chance to rebut/clarify those findings from
their perspective. A letter of agreement was signed by both Dr. Nellius and me in
December of 2010 (See Appendix B). IRB approval was also granted in December of
2010 (See Appendix A).
In essence, I interviewed all available subjects who fit the criteria of having
worked pre- and post-transition by using a snowball sampling method. It is important to
note that my sample size was limited for several key reasons. First, several years have
transpired from the initial conception of this project, and many of the available interview
pool could not be located. Some potential participants had left the area, and several had
retired. Many who are still working in the family safety arena in Brevard County simply
could not find the time to participate. Several who continue working in the field simply
declined to participate due to concerns over their employers finding out that they had
participated, even when I assured them that every measure to ensure confidentiality
would be taken. While I initially estimated roughly forty applicants might be available
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within the sample, in the end, fifteen agreed to participate, with fourteen of those
agreeing to be interviewed.
I initially contacted four participants who were personally known to me. None of
these four are currently employed by BFP or any of its sub-contracted entities. These
four respondents were interviewed for their knowledge of the family safety system preand post-privatization. At the conclusion of their interviews, these four were given
recruitment instructions to contact individuals who they felt fit the criteria of the research
project, and in turn, those new participants contacted me. This method was employed at
each stage of the interview process, for a cumulative total of three stages and fifteen
participants. While potential participants are still occasionally contacting me, I had to
establish a firm “end” date for the interview process, and therefore, anyone who
contacted me after June 30, 2011 was not interviewed for this project.
Only one participant was not interviewed due to a current employment with one
of the aforementioned agencies. This particular participant was concerned about
employment safety however this individual wanted to participate and was willing to
assist me with finding several additional interviewees who otherwise would not have
been included in the project.
All participants were assigned numbers based on their interview order and their
actual names were not recorded for purposes of reporting in this research. My decision
to assign numbers rather than names was to protect the identities of the specific
participants. With genders revealed, it would become much easier to identify a few of
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the participants from the details of their interviews. With genders hidden, figuring out
who was interviewed will be a challenge. The participants were interviewed based on
my personal knowledge of their current employment status (meaning I knew that they
did not work for the BFP or any sub-contracted agency at the time of the interview); or
they were interviewed “blind” (meaning that I did not have personal knowledge of their
current employer or their current employment status). Participant 15 chose not to grant
an interview however was essential to contact with participants 5, 11, 12 and 14:

Investigator

1

3

2

13

9

4

10

7

8

15

5

6

Figure 2: Snowball Sample
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14

Research Design and Methodology

My research involves individual interviews using both open- and closed-ended
questioning. In addition some general quantitative data collection occurred with regard
to collection of educational backgrounds of the participants as well as public agency
records that provide information on caseloads and types of cases accepted/rejected for
assignment. I have audio recorded all interviews and conducted the interviews over a
period of approximately six months, from January of 2011 through June of 2011.
I have conducted original research for the bulk of my study; however, I also used
some existing public records data. Of course, budget information, State laws and
regulations are available under the “Sunshine Law,” which gives “every person… the
Constitutional right to inspect or copy any public record with some exemptions” and
“provides a right of access to government proceedings at both the state and local levels”
(Government in the Sunshine). A contact at the State Office for Public Information also
proved to be very helpful in locating statutes and information on family safety
privatization in Florida. In addition, much of the data regarding local successes and
failures is available on the BFP website (http://brevardfp.org/).
I did not access any confidential information with regard to the clientele of these
agencies. Knowing that confidentiality of child welfare cases is of the utmost
importance, this is not an area that I explored.
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An interaction approach served as the overarching means by which I approached
the interview phase of this research. Interactionism rests on the premise that meanings
are essential with regard to human behavior and action (Blumer 1969). It is my
assertion that the professional lives of family safety workers must be meaningful in
order for them to do optimal work. Further, I assert that it is essential for these workers
to “buy into” the systems of care under which they work. The notion of “buying in”
cannot be underestimated, as the ways in which caseworkers view their jobs must
impact the ways in which they do their jobs. And, for this work, the meanings that
workers attach to their work and to their employers are essential. This is not a job which
allows for a numbing of the mind; one cannot do this job by simply going through the
motions during a forty-hour work week. A caseworker is always “on,” always thinking of
the individuals who are impacted by how they do their work. In addition, a caseworker is
always being impacted by their cases—going into someone’s home under the most
extreme circumstances imaginable by “normal” standards has psychological and social
impacts to the worker which may, over time, serve to infiltrate and change the worker.
Herbert Blumer (1969: 2-3) asserts three main premises with regard to an
interactionist perspective. First, he asserts that “human beings act toward things on the
basis of the meaning things have for them.” Second, he states that “the meaning of
such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with
one’s fellows.” And third, that “meanings are handled in, and modified through, an
interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things he (or she)
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encounters.” Blumer further asserts that to neglect the role of meaning as it relates to
behavior would be seen by an interactionist as “falsifying the behavior under study”
(Blumer 1969: 2-3).
For the caseworker, the premises that Blumer lays out are key, not only to their
ability to do their work, but also to their readiness to “buy into” the systems of care in
which they work. Family safety workers often identify with their jobs as “callings.”
Further, they begin to develop definitions of self which are informed by the roles they
internalize as caseworkers. This interactionist perspective will allow me to probe the
underlying meanings that family safety workers attach to their work and to their
definitions of self, while also exploring how important it is for them to believe in the
system in which they work every day.
Second to my exploration of perceptions, I discover some macro level forces at
play with respect to the movement of family safety programs from the public to the
private sector by using a feminist perspective. By focusing on the nature of gendered
inequality, I show how the decision to privatize family safety is indeed, as Gwendolyn
Mink points out in her 2009 work, a gendered political issue.
Reaching back to the mid-1900s, the concept of “women as minority” begins to
appear in research literature. Feminist ideas about the treatment of women help to
frame my assertion that women and their concerns (historically speaking, housekeeping
and child rearing) served to classify them as less important than men, and therefore
allows us, in the current day, to jettison their public needs to private agency care
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(Hacker 1951; Stoll 1973; and Cohen 1969). Distancing our government entities from
the concerns of women and children adds fuel to the feminist fire. The notion that we
live in a patriarchy should not be forgotten. Even in the contemporary literature on the
politics of gender, assertions remain that “gender is an institutionalized system of social
practices for constituting people into two significantly different categories, men and
women, and organizing social relations on the basis of that system” (Ridgeway and
Correll 2004:510). My assertion is that even as one of the subtle underlying intentions
of privatization was indeed patriarchal in motivation as well as discriminatory in action,
the results to date have been positive for the many political and social issues that
continue to impact women and children in society today.
Using a backward mapping technique, I was able to conduct my research at an
intimate level with those whom are impacted by policy decisions on a day-to-day basis.
The consequences of policy decisions—frequently made without the input of lower level
workers—are often unintended, but nonetheless have serious consequences on an
employee’s ability to do her job.
Wildavsky (1988) calls these serious consequences “ubiquitous anomie.” He
asserts that the situations of public servants are the effect, not the cause of problems
within the sphere of public service, problems caused by the politics of the day. I believe
Wildavsky’s observation to be especially true in the family safety arena; due to several
high profile cases, top-level administrators began to set forth myriad mandates and
rules under which caseworkers had to function. Many of these rules made sense: within
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the first 24 hours of the commencement of a case, the worker had to visit with the
family; within the first week of the case being commenced, the worker had to have the
victim fingerprinted and photographed. Some of these new mandates however were
cumbersome and challenging for the caseworker to accomplish. For example, for
children with severe emotional problems, behavioral health assessments had to be
completed within a very short time frame, and if not done, caseworkers were held
accountable. To get a behavioral health assessment completed, a competent, FDCF
recognized and state-certified therapist must be located, the child must be fitted into the
practitioner’s schedule (while hopefully not impacting the child’s school day), and the
therapist’s report had to physically be in the case (or in the hands of the judge presiding
over the case) within a very short period of time. The deadlines that the state set forth
for this type of action were rarely met, and when not met, the caseworker was held
accountable—even when the reasons were outside of her control. These types of
mandates often caused tension as workers struggled to accommodate the mandates
set down from the top while also doing their jobs in a manner which worked at the street
level.
To get at the problems forced upon the worker in a top-down manner, backward
mapping is used to try to tease out the daily strains and stressors that workers deal with
as a result of ineffective or unclear policies thrust upon them from above.
Backward mapping relies on the idea that “policymakers have a strong interest in
affecting the implementation process and the outcomes of policy decisions” (Elmore

92

1979-1980: 604). Using this approach, I interviewed those whose positions are/were at
the lowest hierarchical levels of family safety work in Brevard County. Examining the
specific perceptions of those field-level workers at the lower end of the administrative
hierarchy allowed me to gather the broadest perspectives and look for themes within the
interviews.
Worker perceptions of pre- and post-privatization in Brevard County helps us to
have a complete picture of how this system of care is working in light of new policies
and procedures. This type of technique also allows for top level administrators to “hear”
what workers are saying, what they believe to be true, and what they believe to be
working within a new system of care. These perceptions are relevant, but often
overlooked—or unknown—to administrators.
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Figure 3: Backward Mapping
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When changes in systems are mainly implemented and viewed from a “topdown” point of view, lower-level worker perceptions and beliefs are often ignored or
discarded as irrelevant to the bigger picture (Elmore 1979-1980). This technique closes
the loop, allowing lower-level workers to feel validated while upper level administrators
can better understand the issues of workers who have first-hand experience working
within new systems.
This technique compliments the work of Glaser and Strauss (1967), who use
grounded theory to extract theory from data. Glaser and Strauss assert that the focus of
social science research should be in allowing data to determine the theoretical
outcomes of the research, rather than a focus on verification of existing theory. While
this method of inquiry is not without issues, in conjunction with backward mapping, it
allows for a strong foundation for this project.
In addition, I chose to use Dorothy Smith’s Standpoint as a research method and
interviewing technique; this presents both benefits and drawbacks. My understandings
of how my perspectives impact this research are both crucial and potentially
problematic. My having experienced the same workplace actions, tensions and
concerns as my research participants gives me unique and different perspectives than
that of a researcher attacking the problem from the outside. I believe this to be of great
value in that it, perhaps, allows me to have a deeper and more meaningful
understanding of the data than a researcher who tackles this kind of research with no
“insider knowledge.”
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As scientific process, the notion of standpoint is generally not acknowledged
however, Smith’s original intention was to utilize the idea of standpoint as a method of
social inquiry rather than a theoretical position. Part of the problem with recognizing
standpoint as a method of inquiry and not as theory is in part due to Smith’s
understandable reluctance to quantify exactly what she means by “standpoint” (Smith
1992). Standpoint as either method or theory has, according to Smith, been
simultaneously described as both “correct and… miss(ing) the point altogether” (89).
Utilizing such an approach as a method has foundational issues in comparison to
our more familiar and established Cartesian approach to science, however, with regard
to this project, I believe the benefits or using it as a method far outweigh the
exclusionary statements against using it.
One of my primary reasons for using it is my familiarity with the social service
systems in Brevard County. For several years, I worked in a caseworker and supervisor
capacity for the FDCF, and I still maintain strong ties to the community. I believe this will
work to my advantage, as my “standpoint” will allow me a unique position into
understanding the positive and negative aspects of the caseworker’s job, both when the
FDCF served as the delivery agency, and as privatization occurred.
Standpoint, in conjunction with grounded theory allows both the participant and
me to create understandings as we move through the interview process. The context of
each interview and my relationship to the participants is essential to the creation of deep
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and meaningful collection of data during the interview process as well as allowing for a
meaningful understanding of the data in the post-interview analysis.
Impacts of the New System on Family Safety Workers
As previously mentioned, in order to reach the largest population sample
possible, I interviewed all available research participants in Brevard County who fit the
criteria for my project using a snowball sampling technique.
I interviewed those who have experience as State employees as well as those
who only have experience with privatization. These participants were interviewed to
garner in-depth information about program effectiveness, levels of personal and
professional contentment with the new systems of care, understandings of differences
and similarities between the FDCF and private agency care, and levels of job
satisfaction pre- and post-privatization.
In total, fourteen interviews were conducted, totaling 654 minutes of audio taped
sessions. The average length of interviews is 46.7 minutes, with the shortest lasting 18
minutes, and the longest lasting 62 minutes. The interviews were conducted in the
homes of respondents, in my home and at public venues in Brevard County. My efforts
were concentrated on those respondents who have/had experience working under both
public and private care systems in an effort to draw out differences and similarities in
the two systems. As a nod toward future research plans, I also inquired about individual
motivations for leaving employment in the family safety arena.
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As a caseworker, I was in the field nearly every day. Interviewing all of the key
“players” in an individual case entailed hundreds of hours of face-to-face interviews,
telephone calls, email exchanges and court proceedings. Interview situations were often
less than optimal, with crisis framing the interactions I had with families. Nonetheless, it
was my job to defuse the situation and to make some sense of what had happened and
why it had happened. Initial assessments were always tense, with resistant
perpetrators, angst-filled family members and children whose emotions ranged from
guilty to rebellious. Learning how to develop a rapport was essential and learning how
to quickly read people to get a feel for their personalities was vital. I learned techniques
for taking field notes, and methods for interpreting them at a later date. I filed numerous
judicial documents upon which judges and attorneys had to rely to understand cases.
Attention to detail became second nature, and as I learned the job, my ability to
articulate a case in writing slowly became easier to accomplish.
My years of service as a caseworker, and then as a caseworker supervisor,
afforded me invaluable practice at interviewing and interacting with others. I spent
hundreds of hours interviewing key players in cases, I observed other caseworkers,
attorneys and judges questioning family members, and I eventually moved into the role
of teaching new caseworkers the “ropes” by going with them into the field while they
worked with families. I learned what works and what doesn’t work. I learned that not
every interview benefits from the same interview techniques, and I honed my
interviewing skills.
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The primary goal of my job, in all but the most egregious cases, was to keep the
family intact through State intervention which would teach the family new and productive
ways to behave. My most valuable asset was my ability to develop a rapport with my
clients; to foster a non-judgmental interview environment with them which would allow
them to feel that they could open up and tell me about their family’s dysfunctions.
The physical environment in which a caseworker does her job is perhaps one of
the most challenging interview venues. Most of the time, social science researchers
have some control over the places where they conduct their interviews; caseworkers
must go into homes that may be dirty or physically hazardous, and which are nearly
always emotionally hostile. Aside from the initial investigatory contact of the child
protective investigator, the caseworker’s job is one that is done without law enforcement
presence—regardless of any hostilities which may be present in any home environment.
In spite of these less than optimal conditions, the caseworker must develop a rapport
with all family members and must convince them that their involvement with the agency
is essential.
My work experience taught me about interviewing and the skills I learned in my
job have been invaluable to my research—whether closed- or open-ended questions, I
feel that I am well versed in how to conduct successful interviews.
Qualitative Methodology: Interviews
Semi-structured interviews were used, allowing for the flexibility to tailor each
interview to the individual participant. There were several key questions which were
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asked of each participant which dealt with the educational background and the work
experience of the individual. This approach allowed me to gather some quantifiable data
while also allowing for deep, meaningful responses to open-ended questions later in the
interview. In essence, the interview schedule was loosely sectioned into three areas: 1)
qualitative data, 2) questions specific to the participant’s job and the processes of the
job, and 3) feelings and perceptions about the work and about privatization.
I began each interview with questions that asked participants for background
information regarding their length of employment, educational backgrounds, and other
pertinent basics about the particular jobs they perform (or performed) while working in
family safety. I then moved to semi-structured general questions about their occupation
and work settings (“Why did you become a caseworker?” “What do you think the role of
a caseworker is?” “What is the most difficult aspect of your job?” “What is the most
rewarding?”), as well as more probing questions that focused on privatization (“How
would you characterize your workload post-privatization as compared to your workload
before privatization?” “What do you think are/were the biggest obstacles that you face in
meeting your client’s needs?” “Has your ability to meet client’s needs been altered since
the agency became privatized?” “How do you feel about the work you do now?” “How
do you feel privatization is working?”). All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed
for analysis. As noted above, my analysis examined the interviews for common themes
with regards to work-related issues, administrative expectations, and worker
perceptions of program effectiveness regarding privatization. Interviews were
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anonymously transcribed utilizing a professional transcriber. That is to say, the names
of interviewees were not provided to the transcriber, and the transcriber was not
provided with any background information regarding the research.
My analysis uses what Altheide (1987) calls an ethnographic content analysis
(ECA) of interview data. ECA is the best fit for this project as while it is “systematic and
analytic” (Altheide 1987: 68), it will also allow for my experiences as a caseworker and
as a researcher to be central to my project. Reflecting on the work of Withorn
(2001:116), my project differs by using ECA to present findings, rather than simply
presenting a speculative essay about the impacts of privatization. Further, as
Sandelowski (2000: 336) asserts, this type of analysis leaves room for “qualitative
description” which allows me to flesh out the unanticipated themes that arose during
interviews and while analyzing data. According to Sandelowki, this type of research
differs from “grounded theory, phenomenologic, ethnographic, or narrative studies” in
that the language of the interviewee is “a vehicle of communication, not itself an
interpretive structure that must be read” (336).
There are some similarities to grounded theory. Glaser and Strauss (1967)
describe the process of grounded theory as being reflexive and recursive as the
researcher(s) continually evaluates and analyzes the categories that emerge. Unlike
grounded theory, however, ethnographic content analysis does not have theory
development as its goal, but instead focuses on clear descriptions and definitions
compatible with the materials (Altheide 1987). Similar to the “interpretive content
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analysis” described by Ahuvia (2001), I examined the interview data to see how it fits, or
fails to fit, with emerging patterns as a whole (Lofland and Lofland 1984). As topics and
themes emerged during interviews, they were incorporated into subsequent interviews
to provide a measure of face validity (Schwartz and Jacobs 1979). Throughout this
process I collected information on perceptions which may be specific to selected
caseworkers; however, my analysis focuses on presenting those patterns which emerge
as shared perceptions among caseworkers (Lofland an Lofland 1984). The obvious
advantage to this type of method is that it allows for a presentation of findings which is
organized in a way which best fits the data (Sandelowski 2000).
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CHAPTER FOUR: PERCEPTIONS

What Workers are Saying about Privatization

Those who participated in interviews were, for the most part, seasoned veterans
of both public and private family safety systems in Brevard County. The average length
of service in the family safety arena was ten years, with a high of twenty-three years,
and a low of one year. The cumulative experience, in years, of this group within Brevard
County family safety is 140. The pool of respondents averaged just over seven and a
half years of experience with FDCF, and just over three years of experience with private
agencies within Brevard County. Ten of fourteen (71%) continue to work within the
Brevard County child welfare system in some capacity; one has retired; three are now
working in unrelated professions. Eight of the fourteen (57%) have advanced degrees at
the master’s level, and all but four hold degrees which are in some aspect related
specifically to the profession of family casework (psychology, sociology, criminology, or
social work). The most common bachelor’s degree held is in the discipline of
psychology (4 or 28.5%), and the most common master’s degree held is in the discipline
of sociology (4 or 28.5%). Two of the participants completed internships with FDCF prior
to completion of their bachelor’s degrees and both went on to accept paid positions with
FDCF after completion of their degrees.
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The participants “clustered” into three distinct but overlapping work areas:
investigations, services and administration. To better envision the differences in the
three cluster areas, a variation of a truth table was constructed (Table 4). In general, as
can be seen in the cluster comparison, there were some positives as well as some
negatives noted.
One area of discussion which developed as a strong theme which was not
specifically related to this research project was that of being “called to the work.” 43
percent of respondents (six of fourteen) mentioned a feeling of intimacy with regard to
the work they do, and a feeling of the work being more than just a job:
What I remember in college, I was always like ‘oh I will never do social
work, I will never do social work, I will never do social work!’ And then you know,
I got out of college and it was very difficult to find a job. And I got an interview
with DCF and I thought well, you know, I will do this for a year or two. And I
remember like my second week going, um, this is going to be it. I found, like, I
was wrong. (Participant Three)
I believe that people are called to this work… I was called to this work for
some reason and I know the children’s lives I have saved. And so, I feel like I
need to continue until I do not want it anymore, I guess. It’s the child… somebody
has to be there for the kids. They did not ask to be here. (Participant Seven)
I knew I wanted to work with kids. That’s always been what I wanted to do.
(Participant Nine)
Perhaps this feeling of being called to the profession is a necessary justification
for those who choose to stay in the family safety profession for any length of time.
Research on job satisfaction is generally conducted in the areas of affective and
cognitive attitudes and beliefs (Fisher 2000). Affective attitudes are those which
encompass moods and emotions, and cognitive beliefs are those which ask for a
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comparative feeling about one’s profession as compared to others’ (186). In the case of
these six participants the affective justifications are clear within their narratives. Of the
six who cited a calling to the job, the average length of service was just over ten years
for this group, as compared to 7.5 years for the entire sample.
When I worked in family safety there was a common explanation for being able
to—and wanting to— do this type of work for a length of time. We would say that
workers who felt that type of “calling” do the work didn’t look at the clock, and for them,
time was inconsequential. For those who were not well-suited to the work, we would
often say that no amount of hours in the day would help them to get the job done well.
In other words, feeling empathy toward the job was a key to being a successful longterm family safety worker. Having a meaningful, personal reason for liking the work and
for doing it well seems to continue to be primary the motivator for working in this field.
Reflection
The biggest problem encountered throughout the course of this project was time.
By the time the interviews took place, considerable time had passed from the original
conception of the project. Many of those who initially agreed to be interviewed could not
be located when data collection began. In addition, due to limitations placed on the
available pool of respondents, the number of interviews completed was smaller than
anticipated. The issues encountered in dealing with BFP also added a considerable
amount of time to the project, and eventually my attempts to include them in the project
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were minimized due to the time constraints on project completion. Nonetheless, with the
limits imposed, several strong themes emerged.
While I had hoped to have been able to conduct quite a few more interviews, I
feel that the information I gathered is important, and I feel that some very strong themes
emerged. I was pleasantly surprised at the overall positive commentary on the BFP
CARES program, and was excited to learn about it and how it has helped our local
community.
Many of the negative themes that emerged during the interview process were
surprising to me. While I think it is fair to say that since agencies are now physically—
and philosophically—separated and that this is driving many of the communication
issues that were raised, my initial thoughts about smaller, local agency oversight were
that these issues would be minimized rather than aggravated.
Personally, I enjoyed the data collection process, and I felt a bond with those
who participated. I had worked alongside some who participated when I was at FDCF,
and so I was able to catch up and rekindle old acquaintances. Some who participated
were strangers to me, and it was rewarding to get to hear their perspectives and to find
out about their experiences.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE INVESTIGATORS

There were a few themes indicated in this cluster. The single most prevalent
theme which developed from the investigative cluster (comprised of workers whose
primary jobs continue to be as child protective investigators and child protective
investigator supervisors) was related to staffing and proximity. Also problematic for this
cluster was knowledge of service providers and referral protocols.
Staffing and Proximity Issues

Prior to privatization, investigators (CPIs) and service workers (FSCs) worked in
the same physical location. When cases needed to be handed over from the
investigative unit to the services unit, everyone impacted by the staffing was in close
proximity and most of the workers on both sides of the house had very close working
relationships.
It was not uncommon for a CPI or a CPI supervisor to have favorite FSCs and
FSC supervisors. Often, “off the cuff” conversations about a case prior to an actual
staffing would happen in hallways or in break rooms as a routine part of working in such
close quarters. I recall many times where CPIs or CPI supervisors came to my office,
and even though I was not on rotation to get a new case, asked me (as a favor) to take
a particular case. FSCs had particular strengths with certain types of cases. Some liked
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to work cases which were involved with the court system as they were defined by court
orders and the judges assigned to work with FDCF. Others preferred voluntary cases
whereby the parent or primary caregivers agreed to work with a FSC of their own
accord and without judicial oversight or intervention.
Many FSCs had certain types of maltreatments that they were good at working—
in my case, due to my educational background, I often received cases involving
domestic violence between parents. I also often received cases with parents who lived
in lower-income neighborhoods—my supervisor knew that I grew up in a housing
project, and I believe she felt this gave me a better insight into households which were
poverty-stricken. At some point during my career at FDCF, I actually worked a case that
was in the exact same project house in which I grew up.
And so, CPIs and CPI supervisors would seek out specific FSCs for specific
types of cases, and this frequently happened as you met with another worker in the
hallway or sat with them during a working lunch. With the shift to privatization, the
physical locations of the two groups were severed, with the CPI side of the house
maintaining a separate facility from the FSC side of the house, thus making it
impossible to have these sorts of “fly-by” conversations between CPIs and FSCs.
With three participants in this cluster (21% of the respondents), there was a 100
percent agreement that there are problems related to staffing as well as problems
related to being physically located in separate facilities from the services workers (BFP
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and its entities). When asked, the respondents in this cluster were clear about their
feelings regarding problems related to staffing/proximity:
…they [services] were in the same building, we had a rapport with them,
these are the people we work with all the time. We knew what was expected, we
knew the information we had to provide to them, and that was their job. It was to
respond immediately and I thought that worked so well. (Participant One)
…back when we were working together both out in the field, if you wanted
to staff a case, even though the case was closed for you and you really were
done with your responsibility, there were a lot of cases that we would see each
other in the hall and you’d say “how are so and so doing? (Participant Eight)
So, if we had been in the same building and we were in the same agency,
it would have been a conversation between two CPIs and two supervisors… I do
not know who the case manager is, were they at the arraignment? I am like, oh,
hi, nice to meet you! What does that say to people that we do not even know
each other? I walk into staffings. I do not know who is who. But we are making
these major… decisions. To the families… it’s major and I never forget that. So I
do believe, I wish we were closer. I wish we were in the same building. I wish we
were part of the same agency. (Participant Thirteen)
Service Provider and Referral Protocols

Less significantly indicated, but still problematic was the CPI’s understanding of
the referral process and their knowledge of service providers. Two of the three in this
cluster indicated that they wanted more training in this area:
I think if they had more time, that they would, or that they had more
knowledge of services… I know my [colleague] often complains about the fact
that during her training they came in and they presented all these providers to
them while they were in training, but, you know it didn’t mean anything to her at
that point. Well, now that she’s been an investigator… she would like to have
training with those service providers again and have them come in and give
her… specifically what is needed… I can’t send an email to these people, I gotta
call them on the phone, you know, where why can’t I just send them an email?
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Why can’t I just send them a fax? No, I gotta call them over and over and over
again until I get somebody to respond to me… (Participant One)
And it is about at least 10-20 minute phone call if they have time... So, 20
minutes for them to ask you series of questions, most of which is already in… our
database that they have access to, is somewhat frustrating… it is just ridiculous
to sit there for 20 minutes to give her the names of everybody in the home. You
got a case with 5 kids; you are giving them all the names, all of the socials, all of
the birth dates, all this information. So, you are talking twenty minutes to make
one referral! [C]an you get us options? We need to be able to have the option of
calling, the option of faxing, and the option of emailing. I do not know where that
is going to go, you know. Ada and Fran are awesome. I do not know how they do
it… they get a lot of information out of us in a very little bit of time, but I do not get
it. I really do not. It’s, it’s…sometimes when I talk… with a couple of my coworkers, we are frustrated by that… because I am off on to the next case. I need
it to be quick and easy. (Participant Thirteen)
…here is how the training needs to be: we do not need someone coming
in and telling us what they do… We need to have one of these weekend retreats
where you take case managers and CPIs, and you put them together in a room,
and you make them work together. Whatever those, whatever those silly things
are. Not letting someone stand there and saying what a CPI does and this is
what case managers… This job is about loyalty and it is about who you can trust.
The problem with CPIs and case managers is you do not know when a case
manager takes over your case. (Participant Thirteen)
It is evident from the statements of the two participants above that there is a
feeling of disconnection between the investigative and the services sides of the house. I
do recall, during my training period, that there was a service provider presentation that
lasted the better part of one entire training day. I also recall being very confused about
the roles of the referral services providers and about how I would utilize the services
that they provided. Once on the job, most of what I learned about those providers ended
up stuffed into a folder that I kept in my office, but in the end, my reliance on other more
seasoned workers was the most beneficial. I could have a short conversation with my
supervisor or with one of my colleagues, and they could tell me right away which service
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to offer, how to make the referral (make a call or fax a form), and they could also tell
me, in many instances, exactly who to ask for when I made the referral.
Because I was on the services side and not the investigative side, I spent a
considerable amount of my workday reviewing my case notes and setting up referrals
for new families on my caseload. It didn’t take long for me to become intimately familiar
with most of our referral services, and to learn what they could and couldn’t do for a
particular family.
I also recall that in many instances, CPIs would ask me to help them figure out if
a service was warranted for a case on their caseload, and how to make the referral.
CPIs, as an essential characteristic of the up-front investigative role they play, do not
make nearly as many referrals as do the FSCs. If a CPI feels the need to make a
referral, it may be that the family only needs to have one isolated type of assistance
(such as help with the costs associated with child care or assistance with the medical
needs of a child). In these cases, the referral can be completed by the CPI without the
need to staff the case over to a FSC. When cases require long term services however
they are staffed to the FSC side and the referrals are completed and monitored by the
assigned worker.
Again, we can see how the proximity issue is a factor. With the CPIs and the
FSCs being in separate buildings, the rapport between the two branches is severed,
and the challenges for the CPI are significant.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE SERVICE WORKERS

The services cluster was comprised of ten participants (67 percent of the
sample), and this category made up the largest group of the project. The areas which
were cited most often for this group fell into five main categories: knowledge of referrals,
less time in the field, camaraderie/morale, communication and power struggles.
Knowledge of Referrals

When privatization was just a blip on the radar, referrals were handled by each
individual FSC for each case on her caseload. In discussion with the FSC supervisor or
alone, an experienced FSC would know what referrals were a good match for a
particular family. In many instances, an experienced FSC might have knowledge of
certain workers within the referral network who were good with particular types of cases
or families. For instance I recall having, for many cases, called a particular worker at a
drug testing referral facility. Because I had worked with this individual on several cases,
she became my “go to” person at that specific referral location. She and I had built a
rapport, and I was able to quickly communicate the specifics of a case to her, and I
knew, based on prior experiences, that the referral had been placed in “good hands.” I
was able to, through building a good working relationship with this individual, fax over
my referral form at a later time, but my telephone contact would open her case right
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away as she was sure from her past experiences working with me that the proper
paperwork would quickly follow our telephone conversation.
Since privatization, the referral process has changed significantly. Referrals are
now handled by a “point person” within each FSC unit, and it appears that, based on
participant commentary, there are more steps involved in getting a referral completed.
In addition, it is taking longer, and time can be a crucial factor to successfully working a
case and to preventing further issues within a family. The longer it takes to get a referral
into a home, the more of a chance there is of further abuse:
Before when you had a case and it was court ordered from the judge
saying that counseling is to happen within a week, you were able to take this
court order to your supervisor who got funding immediately. Here… the
caseworker takes it to a central person at their office who has to send it off to
another person, who has to send it off to another person. So it seems that there
are so many layers that you cannot get anything done within an appropriate time
frame. There is no streamline… There have been times when the judge from the
bench has called directly to the top and that’s the only way it seems like things
can get done. (Participant Five)
Their referrals go through a chain of processes… It goes to someone’s
desk who goes to someone’s desk who goes to someone’s desk. Where it has to
be checked off, approved, find out it’s a Medicaid, throw all the different funding
sources out there, try to find something cheaper… We can’t do that it is too
costly! And their hands are tied a lot of times or it is just time because it just gets
lost. I do not know if it is getting lost on someone’s desk or… But you know what
I mean? It used to be simple... I think there [are] too many levels of participants
and it is getting lost. (Participant Six).
A lot more difficult under CHS, the referrals. Before we would just write
them out and then we would send them up to an agency, make copies and send
them to an agency. Under CHS, we would write them out, make copies, and then
there was a go-between... (Participant Nine)
Well, I think that’s where it gets complicated because it is sort of a
process… it’s somewhat of a group effort, you know, to decide what services
should be put in place. And again, the procedure has changed numerous times
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over the past six years or so on, you know, who makes the decision. Um, and
how we actually get the services. So, as a case manager, I meet with the family, I
do the family assessment, and I have very clear feelings about what services
should be put in place, but yes, I sometimes run into interference from all of
those other participants who think that ‘well, they do not need this,’ or ‘you know
we need to do this instead of that.’ …as a case manager you find yourself in a
position of having to advocate for your families and you sometimes meet some
resistance. I think now maybe more people are involved and maybe that’s the
difference is that there are more players. Um, you know, with varying degrees of
power, let’s say, to make decisions… and to try to…you know, I think that’s
probably the big difference is that there are so many layers. (Participant Twelve)
I remember the paperwork was confusing. You know, like I do the wrong
paper, I turn it in, and it was the wrong form, you know? I just remember it was
confusing. A couple of times I had the form given back to me because it was the
wrong form… and that was kind of a bone of contention between case
management and the care coordinator because it was like we did that form last
month, and [now] you tell me it is the wrong form? (Participant Fourteen)
As Michaels (2010:725) asserts in his research, it is not the role of privatization to
change the system; rather it is the role of privatization to work within the already defined
system, but to do so in a “better, faster, and cheaper” way than the government could.
While a FDCF case often utilized many more service referrals than actually warranted,
the services were referred quickly and efficiently. The “more is better” unspoken
mentality of the referral process at FDCF was certainly not cost-effective, but in the end,
the outlook for the family was reasonably positive and services were delivered
expeditiously.
Now, as it appears that there is some level of difficulty and an increased wait
time for referrals to happen, the family suffers. The responses above are clearly
indicative that this key component—the referral—is not being handled in as efficient a

113

manner as it was prior to privatization, and that the changes to the system have not
been beneficial for the worker or their families.
Less Field Time

Adjunct to the complexities of the referral process comes less time available to
spend in the field. It is somewhat ironic that, as caseloads decreased, FSCs were
unable to increase the time spent in family/home/field settings. Several participants
related the lack of additional field time to paperwork and staffing conflicts:
Well, the more time you spend filling out forms, the less time you have
working with families and doing the field notes that need to be detailed and doing
court documents. Um, that’s the negative side of it. The positive side is like I said
the family team conferences are an excellent model and I doubt that DCF could
pull that off without the assistance of somebody who was coordinating it and
leading it, etc. But some of the time… it would be scheduled at 8 o’clock at night.
It would be scheduled at the convenience of the family but the worker does not
have the ability to keep being at different parts of the county, at different times of
the night or day during the week… so that was difficult. (Participant Two)
…sixty-forty is probably a good estimate… Maybe even 65 to 35. More
time was spent in the field directly with schools, parents, children, you know.
…the amount of time they used to spend [in the field] for the amount of cases we
had, there is no way that having 20 children on your case load and being as busy
as they are that 90% is not based on paperwork or just redundant, redundant
part of it. So I would say now you are talking 20-80. 20% in the field …that they
are seeing the family 20% of the time when we were seeing them 40% of the
time. (Participant Five)
Um, it just seems overwhelming paperwork. And the computer system that
was brought in was supposed to be better and it seems that it made it worse for
people. There [are] more places to fill out and the whole idea was that you put
the person’s information in once and it would populate in all the places it needs to
be. It is not happening. You’ve got to put it in twice as many places as you used
to have to; to populate twice as many forms at this system now generates.
(Participant Four)
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I think they are spending less time in the field…well, but I hear complaints
that some of them are working massive amount of hours but their paperwork is
just….it is overwhelming. The systems they are using right now are not that user
friendly. They have gone through three or four different systems. I am not even
sure what they are called now. (Participant Six)
…the amount of time that I am able to spend with the family in their home
has been greatly reduced because of the need of me to spend some much time
at my desk, kind of chasing down this referral process because there are some
many people that are involved. Um, you know, when I realize that the family is
not getting a service that I have made the referral for, um, then I kind of have to
hunt down where in the process we are. Um, on whose desk is sitting this referral
that I have created? …and that’s just very complicated and it is paper intensive,
and so it is not possible to spend as much time interfacing with the family
because I am kind of chasing down referrals. (Participant Twelve)

One of the primary issues prevalent prior to privatization with regard to “doing”
the work was that of time in the field. While FDCF workers were afforded some flexibility
with regard to scheduling and overtime, it was often a challenge to get the job done in a
reasonable amount of time. With little control over number of assigned cases, there was
always an abundance of work to be done, both in the office and in the field. Part of the
statutory requirement with regard to field work was the requirement to see your victims
and other key players in the case) in the field regularly. This requirement was due, in
part, to mishandled cases where children were found to be missing (or were killed)
without any knowledge of a worker who had not visited the victim or family in a timely
manner. Several high profile cases, including the Rilya Wilson case, forced an
examination of how we checked upon victims, and tightened our oversight on cases and
with individual workers.
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Not only is it important to see the victim/family in a timely manner at the onset of
a case, it is also important to spend quality time with the victim and the family.
Developing a rapport with the subjects of your cases is one of the primary elements to
the successful working of the case, and the eventuality of a successful outcome. Prior to
privatization FSCs often complained of the lack of time to do solid field work due to the
high numbers of cases they held on their caseloads.
One of the appeals to family safety privatization in Brevard County was the
inclusion of a contracted “cap” on the number of victims a FSC would have on her
caseload. Pre-privatization, there was no ability to cap a FSC’s caseload, and it was not
unusual to find a seasoned worker carrying a caseload with a few dozen cases (which
usually also meant more victims as a single case often had multiple child victims). When
it was rumored that privatization would bring a cap on the number of victims on a
caseload, workers were pleased. At continued issue however was how a cap would be
instituted. What mechanism would be put in place which would be different than the
current system? How could a cap be guaranteed when there is no ability to influence
the volume of cases which are produced every day?
As a response to some of these types of questions, what we find is that BFP has
become responsive to the volume of cases by creating different avenues for routing
cases. Some of these avenues do not require there to be a formal caseworker assigned
whose job it would be to see the family in the field; rather, these low risk cases are
assigned to a care manager whose job it is to contact the family and to try to assist

116

them with finding their own referrals within the county. These cases do not require
regular monitoring in the field, and are not assigned to a regular FSC. This is one way in
which the local system has tried to contain the flow of cases from the State’s abuse
hotline. I have been told by several participants that this new approach proves to be
somewhat successful.
On one hand, many families can move through this type of situation by learning
how to take control of the situation, and with minimal intrusion and guidance, can
develop the skills to overcome the situation or problem area. On the other hand, some
of these cases become “revolving door” cases whereby a new case is opened as soon
as one is closed. This phenomenon is not inherent to privatization however with the
FDCF having more than its fair share of “revolving door” cases.

Camaraderie and Morale

Several of the participants in this cluster also mentioned a lack of camaraderie as
perceived as part of the problem with the new model of care. Many mentioned feelings
of “family” when the structure was under one roof, and workers were managed by one
agency. Most saw the physical separation of CPIs and FSCs as problematic to issues of
worker contentment and bonding:
I want to say we were more like a family… We were all located in the
same building. We all worked together. The [CPIs] when the children were first
sheltered, the legal department was right there. We were protective services, the
actual caseworkers… There was a foster care unit, the adoptions unit. Everybody
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was all linked; I would say the word “linked.” I like that. All linked together and
worked cohesively together. I do not see that now. (Participant Six)
We were in one big, huge room together. So it was actually a really good
learning environment because we were able to… every time anyone asked the
supervisor a question, we all heard the answer. (Participant Ten)
It was a very close knit… We were all in one office. And so we, as
counselors, we know the kids that were available for adoption. And we knew the
families that were available for placement as well. So, I found that we made close
connections early on and I think that probably helped children… and I do not feel
that now with privatization it being as close. (Participant Eleven)
Communication

As camaraderie and morale were seen to decrease, increased communication
problems were bound to crop up. Three participants in this cluster articulated what
appears to be the main communication problem: proximity. We now begin to see how
the problem of communication is linked to the problem of the two groups being housed
in separate buildings. In addition to these proximal communication issues, one
respondent also noted the perception of a hierarchical communication issue:
I think that… the more family-like work setting, everyone kind of knew of
each other’s cases where the supervisor knew the case, the attorney knew the
case, it was more of a hands-on approach. (Participant Six)
…they are in their own separate building. That made it difficult because
you could not walk over. Because before I could just walk down a couple of doors
and ask a question… or I could sneak in and talk to one of the attorneys. It was
more difficult to communicate ‘cause inevitably if you want to talk to a [CPI] they
are out in the field, and if they want to talk to you, you could be in staffing all day.
(Participant Nine)
I just think there is probably a lack of communication with the multiple
agencies that are all working together. Whereas before we had it all housed
together… (Participant Eleven)
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Um, I guess generally I felt like, um, there was planning and policy making
and decision making that went on, um, that I was not included in because I was
not management. So I feel like the [program] was managed and guided kind of
independent of me who was working with [parents and caregivers] every day. I
think better decisions could have been made if management included [us] in the
loop more. I just felt like I had something important to contribute. I was never
allowed to either provide feedback or participate. And I was never allowed to
come to the table. (Participant Fourteen)

Power Struggles

One issue that rarely became problematic prior to privatization was that of power
within the local offices. There was a clearly established hierarchy, and there was little to
no reason to question authority. Because it seemed that the rules and mandates that we
worked under were clear and had been established for a great length of time, there was
no discussion about what to do and how to do it. Nearly every situation a worker could
imagine had already been handled by some worker who came before, and rules for
working each particular situation had been set down.
In addition, supervisory and administrative staff was routinely comprised of
former caseworkers who knew how to work cases. One of the biggest assets I feel
working in my favor when I was a FSC was the fact that my supervisor and my Program
Office Administrator were both former caseworkers. When they helped me to make a
decision, or even when they decided a case trajectory for me, I had no reason to
question their decisions as I felt that, with their on-the-job experience, the decision was
sound and based on clearly mandated guidelines. Being a newer agency, BFP did not
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have many of those mandates in place, and I suggest that this lack of structure was felt
by non-administrative and administrative staff:
…but I absolutely noticed it the day I walked into that CBC office, that
there was a lot of power-struggly stuff going on. You know? It was very, very
political. (Participant Ten)
I do not know if that is because the upper managers have control issues,
or if there is, you know, I think everyone has a liability mindset that works in child
welfare. I feel like there [are] a lot of employees that are kind of afraid to say
something or just to suggest change, you know? There is just that kind of fear. I
am going to keep my mouth shut because I need a job. (Participant Fourteen)
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ADMINISTRATORS AND OTHER KEY
PERSONNEL

The administrative cluster was comprised of two participants (14 percent of the
sample), and this category made up the smallest group of the project. The areas which
were cited most often for this group fell into two main categories: proximity issues and
paperwork issues.
Proximity Issues

Like both the CPI and services clusters, the administrative cluster also found the
lack of a central work location for both private and public family safety workers to be
problematic:
That makes me a little nervous. You know, we used to be housed with
CBC and now we are not even housed with them. (Participant Three)
They need to have more communication between CBC [and FDCF] and
stop trying to be so apart from us. Because, yes, I understand, everybody hates
DCF but that’s where you get your job from. That’s where you get your next case
from—is us. And we need to be in more communication with each other. If you
are going to do privatization, you need to be in closer proximity. Otherwise it’s
just not, to me, it’s just not working. (Participant Seven)

Because the two roles, that of CPI and that of FSC are intimately connected, the
severing of a joint location appears to be a step backwards for those who do family
safety work. Because one group relies on the other to close the loop with regard to any
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particular case, working side-by-side is obviously warranted. Additionally, problems
related to not being housed in the same offices do not contain themselves to just a
problem of physical distance—space relates to problems of communication and morale
as well.

Paperwork

Also problematic for the administrative cluster was the increase in the volume of
paperwork that needed to be done on a daily basis. Moving toward privatization was
supposed to save time and paperwork, streamlining the process of doing the day-to-day
administrative actions required of field workers. It is apparent however that this is not
the case:
There is so much paperwork. There is a fight between who’s responsible
for it… It’s always ‘they did not do this and they did not do that…’ There [are] so
many different pieces of paper that have to go along with the transition of going
over. (Participant Seven)
And there is more paperwork now in some respects. There are… more
forms to fill out… more time intensive.” (Participant Three)

As was the case with the services workers, the sheer volume of paperwork
seems to be not only time consuming but also a point of contention between state
employees and privatized workers.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CARES

While the CARES program scored very highly with nearly every participant,
actual knowledge of the purposes and functions of CARES varied. Since this part of the
BFP model is new to Brevard County, it is necessary to understand how this program
fits into the structure of the FDCF family safety system.
As previously mentioned, from the state-level call center, calls are routed to the
local FDCF CPI office. As the case is quickly assigned, the CPI conducts the initial visit
to the victim and family within a few hours time. Once the visit has concluded, the CPI
contacts an Intake Specialist at BFP. The Intake Specialist and the CPI determine the
path that the case will take. Two of the paths that a case may take replicate the former
FDCF system path.
One possible path is that the case becomes a “legal” case, meaning that the
victim is likely removed from the home, the courts are involved, and certain steps must
be adhered to with regard to state statutes. These cases constitute the more egregious
abuse cases, and are also often comprised of families who have repeated contact with
the system.
In legal cases, a Circuit Court judge is assigned to oversee the progress of the
case, with a caseworker assigned to manage the case. In all but the most egregious
cases, reunification is sought, meaning that the goal (or outcome) of the case is for the
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victim and the caregiver to be reunified into one home. The timeline for judicial cases is
driven by state statute in that there are pre-determined time-frames which must be
satisfied within the scope of a case. Shelter petitions, judicial reviews and other court
involvements must be accomplished according to the language of the state laws which
govern family safety as FDCF comes in contact with the court system. While these
cases are managed by a caseworker, it is important to note that the judicial schedule
and state statutes often determine how a case will be worked, in which services a family
will be required to participate, and what will happen if the timeline as outlined by statute
is not met.
At the onset of a legal case, a shelter petition is brought before the judge. This
nearly always happens in the first 24 hours of a legal case. In quick order, a case plan is
created, and this most often happens without any significant input from the family; staff
lawyers, dependency care managers (the new term for what used to be FSCs under the
FDCF system) and their supervisors generally create the case plan from a master
document by cutting the items which do not fit for a specific case. This does not mean
that the case plan is tailored to the individual circumstances of a family; rather, it means
that the items that clearly do not match are deleted from a master form. This leaves
most families with myriad tasks to accomplish by specific deadlines, and often these
tasks are unnecessary or redundant. As an example, an offending parent may be
required to attend anger management classes in conjunction with parenting classes and
drug abuse counseling. It is safe to bet that all three of these referrals contain very

124

similar information on many points. Rather than drill down to only include the specific
tasks to address specific needs/deficiencies for an individual offending parent, it was not
uncommon to see several tasks with significant overlap on a case plan. This often made
it challenging to keep to judicial deadlines for the caseworker; for the parent, the
requirements of a case plan were often overwhelming. Since the case plan was, in most
cases, the guiding document which moved the case toward reunification (and closure),
to have myriad unnecessary or redundant tasks included was counter to the success of
the case. Under BFP, the case plan has been improved upon and instead of being a
document which is primarily driven by professionals and which may contain myriad
overlapping services, it is one in which the family has significant input and which has
been streamlined for specific needs.
The second path, which again is a mirror of the former FDCF system, is for a
case to be “voluntary.” In this scenario, a caseworker is assigned however the courts
are not involved. These cases do not involve removal of the child victim from the
caregiver, and efforts are made to keep the family intact. While a small percentage of
these types of cases do end up judicially involved (for example, in situations where the
abuse or neglect escalates), the overwhelming percentage of these cases ends up
closing within a short period of time. In the former system, any case which did not rise to
the level of “legal” would be captured in this category. The current system maintains this
type of voluntary case, and once a case is determined by the Intake Specialist to fall
into this category, it is assigned to a caseworker at one of the two case management
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agencies contracted to BFP: Devereux or CHS. From Devereux or CHS, it becomes the
caseworker’s responsibility to manage the case until it is closed.
In these types of cases, the experience of the caseworker is important to the
successful and speedy closure of a case. An experienced caseworker might be able to
close a case in as short as three months; most of these cases are not severe enough to
keep the case open for a long period of time.
However it is important to note that, while these cases are called “voluntary”
cases, the level of risk assessed is such that should the caregiver refuse to cooperate,
the case may be reconsidered for the legal route. The determination to step up to the
legal category is determined by the caseworker, the caseworker supervisor and a staff
attorney. If there is insufficient probable cause, the case will be closed. If however there
is sufficient probable cause to step the case up, then it is “converted” to a legal case
under the same guidelines as set forth in state statute. These types of cases involve a
certain amount of pressure from all involved toward the family in order to secure their
agreement to participate. Often, families who resist are reminded that the case will not
simply close due to their refusal; rather, families are advised that the case will be
reviewed by an attorney to see if it can be reclassified as a legal case to be brought
before the judge. This type of “negotiating” with families certainly falls under the purview
of coerciveness, and in effect, the family has little choice but to cooperate.
CARES fits in as another option on the family safely continuum of care, and is
the BFP addition to the former two-option model. At the intake assessment, this may be
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the path chosen for a case, as determined by the Intake Specialist. Cases which are
channeled to this category are considered very low risk, and are not assigned to a
Devereaux or CHS caseworker. CARES also takes self-referred cases, and it is
estimated that about 30 percent of CARES cases are acquired via self-referral.
The first step for a family who is assigned to the CARES program is to be
assessed by a paraprofessional Family Partner (FP). FPs, while not as deeply trained
as caseworkers, have training in front end assessments and are also trained, coached
and mentored extensively in the Wraparound approach and philosophy. The FP training
supervisor for BFP, also known as the Wraparound Fidelity Liaison (WFL), is a former
FDCF caseworker with several years of experience working for the state. In addition,
the WFL has been with BFP since its inception, working upward from the initial Care
Coordinator position at BFP to what would, in the future, become the CARES program,
to his current position in BFP’s hierarchy.
At the case onset, the FP conducts a Strengths and Cultural Discovery
Assessment, a type of informal assessment to gain an understanding of the family’s
strengths and weaknesses, by visiting with the family. Note that, at all stages of the
CARES case, the family is involved and empowered to make decisions and to refuse
services if they so choose. If the family decides not to move forward with the case, the
case is, in essence, closed—because the case did not meet the criteria for one of the
other “levels” of care (legal or voluntary) the family is not required to participate. If the
family chooses to opt out at this early stage, a letter is sent to the family with details
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about how to seek assistance for their particular issues by navigating the myriad
agencies in Brevard County accessible to individuals without the need for professional
referral. The letter also includes specific information on re-opening a CARES case
should they so choose at a future time.
Should the family decide to accept case management in the CARES program,
the case is assigned to a care coordinator. There are five care coordinators in Brevard
County, and each oversees approximately 20-25 cases concurrently. These care
coordinators take the stress away from what used to be a system which was heavily
burdened with low-risk cases.
Care coordinators are certified risk assessors via FDCF protocols, and while they
may also have experience as caseworkers, they do not function in the role of
caseworkers; rather, their job is to set up meetings among interested parties and to
determine if the goals of the case are met. Where a case of this type would have, in the
past, required a caseworker, home visits, a case plan, and a formally opened, strictly
monitored case within the FDCF system, they now require a care coordinator who can
oversee the case from an office locale. This appears to be a cost-effective and
successful strategy for these low-risk types of cases.
Once the case is assigned to a care coordinator, a Family Team Conference
(FTC) is scheduled. These conferences are extremely individualized, and the meetings
are attended by all who have a stake in successful outcomes: both for the family and of
the case. According to the WFL, it is not uncommon for these meetings to be attended
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by the immediate and extended family, interested BFP stakeholders, clergy, child care
workers and school officials. If a specific case warrants, medical professionals such as
therapists, drug counselors and the like are also invited to attend. The meetings take
place at a variety of venues: BFP offices, the family home, the family’s church, or even
in public parks. The purpose of these meetings is to develop a plan with the family that
utilizes their strengths to get their needs met in a venue which not only allows, but
solicits the family voice and choice to participate in their own recovery. This
engagement empowers families to take ownership of their own success. The plan that is
created is comprehensive, but not overwhelming, and addresses all things needed to
ensure the family’s success, including any challenges or barriers to its completion.
CARES cases are generally open for only a few months, with FTC meetings
taking place as often, or as little, as needed. For example, if a case involves a drug
addicted caregiver, FTCs may initially be scheduled more than once a week and as the
caregiver shows progress, the length of time between FTCs increased. The main goals
of the CARES program are to help the family move toward self-sufficiency, to help them
learn to overcome their weakness by using a “learner-centered” approach and to assist
them in strengthening their families. Care coordinators work with families to help them
develops skills to work through any challenges they care which would keep them from
successful, long-term sustainability.
According to the WFL, the recidivism rate for these types of cases is very low.
While there are some families that tend to revolve in and out of the system for many
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years due to the same low-level concerns, this is not due to privatization—FDCF also
had a significant share of families that cycled off and on the rolls. It appears however
that CARES has cut down on the actual numbers of repeat clients and cases, but
caution should be used here and a deeper, more directed analysis should be
undertaken before any definitive statements are made about recidivism.
One concern with the CARES program is how these cases are reported to the
state. Since a significant number of cases are now diverted to the CARES program, and
these cases are essentially worked without a caseworker, they do not exactly fit into the
former reporting model. So, how should we account for these cases? Should they be
counted as successes and aggregated with other legal and voluntary cases? Or should
they be separated from the other two more traditional types of cases?
I would assert that there are two issues at stake here. First, if these cases are
being considered “successes,” then they must be included in the overall rate which is
reported to the state. In other words, if BFP considers these to be legitimate cases, then
we must be sure they are being counted as such at the state level also. While some
may not be comfortable in counting CARES cases legitimately as cases, I believe that
this program is one of the strengths of the model of private care in Brevard County.
Moving away from traditional definitions of what exactly constitutes a case does not
have to mean a lessening of standards. CARES proves that there is more than one way
to work a case, and that in low-risk situations, it is practical and cost-effective to look at
a family-centered case which does not rely on a traditional caseworker experience.
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If BFP counts these cases among its successes and subsequently reports them
to the state as such, then I also believe it would be profitable for BFP to break these
cases out separately. In doing so, the state would clearly see the efficiency of the
model, which may lead to increases in funding for CARES and may also lead to statelevel training opportunities for other jurisdictions. CARES is a BFP program. While other
private agencies around the state may have similar programs, the success of CARES
warrants a close look by the state to see why the program is so successful and further,
whether the program could or should be replicated in other local agencies.
The second issue is cost effectiveness. If there is no need to staff a CARES case
over to a sub-contracted agency, there must be a budget savings for BFP and
subsequently for the state. An aggregated cost analysis of the difference between an
average CARES cases and an average CHS/Devereux case should be of value to the
state as budgetary concerns have always been problematic for the FDCF.
The structure of the CARES program is largely the work of BFP’s CEO, Dr.
Patricia Nellius. It is her vision that has enabled BFP to be consistently among the top
three private agencies in the state. This also highlights the importance of having an
administrator who has a vision and is able to see that vision through to success. While
many other private family safety agencies in Florida have not reported solid levels of
success (with a few losing their contracts), BFP has been among the top performers in
the state, and strong, stable leadership is a factor in this placement.
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While the CARES model might be considered a grassroots model in that it is
centered on what is traditionally considered the lowest level of the case—the family—
working from the family’s point of view has proven to be successful. While the traditional
methods of case management (legal and voluntary) certainly still have validity, CARES
seems to be an effective alternative for many reasons.
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CHAPTER NINE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Backward Mapping

Using Elmore’s (1979-80) approach allows us to work backward to flesh out
primary themes as we develop overarching concepts and theories from within the data.
Here, we find that the primary theme of communication, in myriad ways, begins to
crystallize from within the minor threads of each participant’s narrative.

Communication Between Public and
Private Work Spheres
Communication

Power
Struggle
s

Staffing
issues

Increase
to
Admin.
Personnel

Proximity
Issues

Referral Knowledge

Changes to
Policy/Procedure

Less
Removals

CARES
Program

Working
Together
/Camaraderie

Being
Called
to the
Work

It's a
Business

Figure 4: Backward Mapping of Communication Issues
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More Computer
Work/Less Field
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Lower
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d?

Change

There were three “first level” issues which I identified. While none of these
specifically points to communication as a primary concern, each in its own way
contributes to the overall communication problem and each works its way up the
mapping hierarchy to contribute to the major theme of problematic communication
between public and private spheres. Some of the organizing themes do directly relate to
communication: power struggles: staffing and proximity issues and changes to
policy/procedure serve to confound understandings between field workers and
administrators.
While examining each of these themes separately we may not be able to identify
an overarching communication issue however when using backward mapping as a
guide, we can see how even the smallest of issues can combine to contribute to
structural problems. In addition, in using Elmore’s method, we also see that some of the
problematic areas as noted in the interview discourse—changes to policy and
procedure, lower caseloads and change in general—are the very same positives that
are often raised when public spheres become privatized. That field level workers view
these areas as problematic should not be underestimated. Problems with caseloads
and with interpretations of policies and procedures make it challenging to do family
safety work at the field level. Without an examination of the point of view of the streetlevel worker, we cannot assume a complete picture of the impacts of privatization.
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This hints at what may be the crux of the problem with regard to privatization in
any agency: the ability for public and private spheres to effectively communicate and
interact in order to smoothly and efficiently complete the tasks at hand.
Key Findings

Just as any new agency would expect, BFP has experienced some significant
growing pains. It has also been somewhat fluid in its responses to problematic areas
within its hierarchy. Some would also assert that BFP has been too fluid, with rapid rule
changes which made it challenging to complete the day-to-day tasks of case
management.
Negative Aspects of Family Safety Privatization in Brevard County
The single biggest problem for all of the participants in this project was that of
morale and camaraderie, and this point cannot be emphasized enough. My
recollections of working in family safety are often tempered by recalling the feelings I
experienced alongside my coworkers and my supervisors.
One of the most trying periods of time in family safety work comes during the first
year on the job. I remember feeling stressed, worried, and at times, depressed. I
wondered if I should—or could—continue in this line of work. It was extremely important
for me to be able to express my feelings with other workers who had experienced
exactly the same things that I was going through. Knowing that I was “in it” and that I
was “in it” with my coworkers and my supervisor allowed me to feel a sense of
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belonging—not only to the job, but to my role as a caseworker. Without that connection,
I do not think I would have been able to do the job for any length of time.
Not only was it important to be able to discuss how I felt about the job with my
coworkers, it was also important for me to be able to have an ongoing dialogue with the
CPIs from whom I received my cases. To see them in the hallways and on breaks
allowed me a chance to easily ask follow-up questions. It also allowed the CPIs to find
out about the progress of their cases after they had been handed off to the FSC side of
the house.
This begs the question: what exactly is lost when privatization occurs? I assert
that the loss of camaraderie is integral to being able to do the job of caseworker.
Further, seeing camaraderie more as a multi-layered construct than a singular concept
allows us to begin to understand how important it is. Camaraderie embodies collective
identity, self-efficacy, and development of a job-specific skill set.
Collective identity provides the actor with a sense of belonging to the group, and
thus gives meaning to self and the role. Moreover, it validates the actor’s self-worth
within the occupational role. In sum, this facet of camaraderie serves to enhance the
role-person merger, which is critical in stressful occupations, such as law enforcer,
firefighter, soldier, and family safety caseworker. As Turner (1978: 1-2) asserts, the rolepersons merger occurs when a “role is deeply merged with the person” and when “that
role has pervasive effects” on the personality. Turner goes on to support his role-person
merger concept by stating that a lack of compartmentalization, resistance to abandoning
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the role when able, and the belief system of the individual all play a role in the degree to
which a person merges with their occupational role. The work role is fitted into the
personal hierarchy, and when camaraderie is fractured, the merger becomes more
difficult, and the work role less important to the actor. In addition, those who must
interact in a work relationship view the actor as less of a caseworker. As Turner
intimates, the higher the merger, the more likely the view of the actor is favorable—not
only in the workplace, but also in when attempting to see the actor as a person.
Self-efficacy affords the worker a sense of control over the case, their caseload,
the clients and the conditions of the job. As the role-merger strengthens, so does the
actor’s connection to the job and to his or her coworkers. Internalization of agency goals
becomes more important, and the actor gains an increased sense of their ability to
manage the job and all that it entails. Without the integral component of camaraderie,
self-efficacy is threatened and the ability to do the job and merge with the role remains
unsatisfied.
Casework requires a unique skill set critical to balancing the demands of
administrative norms, the client’s needs and the caseworker’s emotional connection to
their job. The ability to empathize with clients allows the worker to not only manage the
case but also help clients in a meaningful way. Thus, it enhances the actor’s skills to
understand the myriad perspectives needed to assist the client and adhere to agency
mandates. Perhaps the most critical aspect of the skill set for the actor is the ability to
integrate the emotionally charged aspects of casework with the legal and impersonal
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reality of implementing agency and state mandates. The most efficient and obvious way
to do this is via interaction with peers. With avenues to interact shut down as a
byproduct of privatization, an essential component of the caseworker skill set is missing.
The feeling of camaraderie seems to have been lost when BFP was created,
leaving CPIs in one location and FSCs in another. And, viewing camaraderie as a multilayered construct allows us to see how physical separation due to multiple agency
venues can have a serious, long-lasting impact on case outcomes, worker retention,
and overall program efficiency and success.
Positive Aspects of Family Safety Privatization in Brevard County
The CARES program has certainly come out on top with regard to this analysis.
By most accounts, the CARES program has been a positive addition to the hierarchy of
family safety in Brevard County, and has been beneficial to the workers and to the
families they serve. The CARES program seeks to provide “front-end child abuse
prevention services to Brevard County children and families through its innovative
Wraparound Family Team Conferencing model” (“Brevard CARES”). And, from
accounts, this program seems to be working on many levels. While hard evidence of
program success is limited due to the newness of the program, general research in the
area of caregiver involvement in these types of programs show great gains with regard
to child development (Unger et al., 2004).
Limitations
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A serious limitation which nearly proved impossible to overcome was related to
cooperation from BPF. Initially this project was given a verbal approval in late 2009.
This approval was subsequently overturned months later by the agency’s Board of
Directors. After nearly a year of renegotiating and meeting with BFP administrators, I
was given limited approval to continue with the project, and was assigned to their Client
Relations Specialist. Contact initially seemed to flow well, and the Client Relations
Specialist was quick to respond to my needs. As I moved along with my project, I was
able to reach my contact via email to apprise her of the nearing completion of my
interviews. My next step, as outlined in several emails with the Client Relations
Specialist, was to allow BFP administrators to read a summary of my findings and to
convene a discussion with them which would allow them to address the findings. I
envisioned their responses for inclusion in this project. In the last several months
however I encountered increasing difficulty in contacting the Client Relations Specialist,
and on some occasions, waited weeks before getting replies to my emails.
In late January of 2012, I was finally notified by a BFP administrator that the
Client Relations Specialist had been in and out of work for several months due to a
personal issue. Unfortunately, no one had been responding to her emails for some
months; when she was able to go to work, our email correspondence seemed stuck as I
spent time reviewing with her where we had been before she went out on leave. I was
not made aware until the end of January 2012 that she had not been at work since
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before the end of 2011, at which time it was too late to include any additional interviews
with BFP personnel.
With the project nearing completion, because of the gaps in time that transpired
between 2011 and early 2012, I must discontinue my desire to include a section on
BFP’s responses to the findings. While I had hoped to be able to speak with BFP about
my findings, the length of time lost in the last several months precludes me from doing
so. If at a future time BFP would like to review and comment on my findings, additional
research may be mounted with regard to this project.
The limitations of the agency left me with no real avenue for pursuit of
information from within, and thus, the project had to be redesigned to include a different
sample population. Had I had contact with BFP staff to conduct unhampered interviews,
I believe this project would have been stronger. As a former family safety worker, the
reluctance of the agency to be cooperative gives me pause, and lends some weight to
the assertions of many researchers highlighting the complications of devolution and
privatization from a research perspective. If private agencies do not have transparency
to the research community, we cannot expect to fully understand the successes and
failures of individual agencies and programs. In order to combat the problems of
“ubiquitous anomie” which Wildavsky mentions (1988) we must have access to
agencies to conduct program evaluations and to compare data across agencies and at
the aggregate level. If we do not have access, comparisons may be of little benefit. We
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must understand the data, why it is collected and by what mechanisms it is collected in
order to be able to robustly and accurately interpret it.
Of course the primary and obvious limitation to this study is the inability to
generalize the findings, and while there will be some usefulness to other private
agencies and potentially to local and State government officials, because each private
agency has its own internal structure, hierarchy and methods of performing casework it
would be difficult to overlay the findings of my small study to another agency in another
county or state.
Of benefit, however, is the potential for a model system of care. The findings of
this case study show that the structure, hierarchy and methods of performing casework
in Brevard County are somewhat improved from the State’s prior model, and this could
prove beneficial to any family safety agency that is in the preliminary or planning stages
of development. With myriad private systems of care in place in the State and
nationally, it would be premature at this time to attempt anything of larger scope (such
as a comparative study across counties). This case study however gives us a baseline
by which to begin and allows us to make adjustments to the method if needed before
larger studies are commissioned. In addition, we should exercise a fair amount of
caution here when moving from a research perspective to a plan of implementation.
Moving too quickly, or attempting to do “too much, too soon” will result in the masking of
results that many are cautioning against. A thorough program evaluation is necessary
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prior to any movement toward the need for changes which may be reflected in this
study.
At this time, the anecdotal evidence of program success here in Brevard County
is warranted—with some reservations. While many other counties in Florida have had
administrative and child safety issues within the private system, several of my former
colleagues have reported on the success of community based care here in Brevard
County. Conversely, while some aspects of this system are found to be working at a
less than optimal state, the areas for improvement which have been indentified can
certainly help to restructure or realign internal concerns.
Future Research Directions and Recommendations

Additional research must be mounted as additional data become available. In the
next few years, I believe we will have robust data from several states which have
privatized and at that point, comparison studies may be of value. In addition, I believe it
to be of value to our legislators and our top state-level family service administrators to
take a more detailed look at how data are being reported via each private agency in the
state. A thorough understanding of how each agency reports is necessary in order for
statements of program success to be validated. Because divestment allows for myriad
accountabilities, it may prove necessary for the state to employ an independent
contractor to query each private jurisdiction and to thoroughly vet and report their
findings directly to those with an influence in state and local level policy decision
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making. In addition, I suggest that the state incorporate language into individual agency
contracts which compels them to allow independent researchers access to their data
and their methods of collecting and reporting to the state.
This notion moves us back to the work of Lipsky (1980), who reminds us that
street-level bureaucrats do not always interpret mandates in the same manner in which
legislators intended. With outside eyes on the work that local agencies do, we have a
better chance of closing the loop on our understanding of how mandates are intended to
be used (by the writers of the law) and how they are actually carried out at the lowest
levels.
In addition, I believe that it is essential to have the two divisions of family safety
workers—state-employed CPIs and privately-employed FSCs—in the same physical
location. With the two groups separated, a physical and emotional barrier has been
created. Where there used to be a close knit and cordial feeling between the two
groups, a feeling of ambiguity (and sometimes animosity) has been created by
separating the two groups into different locations in the county.
Based on my research, the solution for improving relations between groups and
enhancing agency efficacy resides in developing a strong sense of camaraderie among
front-line workers across multiple agencies. This can be accomplished with a
willingness to learn about each other and the various job roles and with offering the
appropriate venues to do so; by developing an atmosphere of trust with opportunities of
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communicate and share experiences; and with a state-level commitment to connecting
public and private workers at the grassroots level.
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Table 1 US Census Demographic Characteristics: Brevard County, Florida
People
Population, 2009 estimate
Persons under 5 years old, percent, 2008
Persons under 18 years old, percent, 2008
Persons 65 years old and over, percent, 2008
Female persons, percent, 2008
White persons, percent, 2008
Black persons, percent, 2008
American Indian and Alaska Native persons, 2008
Asian persons, percent, 2008
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, 2008
Persons reporting two or more races, percent, 2008
Persons of Hispanic or Latino origin, percent, 2008
White persons not Hispanic, percent, 2008
Living in same house in 1995 and 2000, 5 yrs old & over
Foreign born persons, percent, 2000
Language other than English spoken at home, 5+, 2000
High school graduates, percent of persons age 25+, 2000
Bachelor's degree or higher, pct of persons age 25+, 2000
Persons with a disability, age 5+, 2000
Housing units, 2008
Homeownership rate, 2000
Housing units in multi-unit structures, percent, 2000
Median value of owner-occupied housing units, 2000
Households, 2000
Persons per household, 2000
Median household income, 2008
Per capita money income, 1999
Persons below poverty level, percent, 2008

Business
Total number of firms, 2002
Black-owned firms, 2002
American Indian and Alaska Native owned firms, 2002
Asian-owned firms, 2002
Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander owned firms, 2002
Hispanic-owned firms, 2002
Women-owned firms, 2002
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Brevard
County
536,357
5.2%
19.9%
20.5%
50.9%
85.6%
10.1%
0.4%
2.0%
0.1%
1.7%
7.2%
79.1%
51.6%
6.5%
8.7%
86.3%
23.6%
97,120
267,456
74.6%
22.5%
$94,400
198,195
2.35
$49,473
$21,484
10.7%

Brevard
County
38,621
3.8%
Not available
3.4%
Less than
100
4.0%
32.4%

Florida
18,537,969
6.2%
21.8%
17.4%
50.9%
79.8%
15.9%
0.5%
2.3%
0.1%
1.4%
21.0%
60.3%
48.9%
16.7%
23.1%
79.9%
22.3%
3,274,566
8,800,294
70.1%
29.9%
$105,500
6,337,929
2.46
$47,802
$21,557
13.3%

Florida
1,539,207
6.6%
0.6%
2.7%
0.1%
17.3%
28.4%

Geography

Brevard
County
1,018.19
467.8

Land area, 2000 (square miles)
Persons per square mile, 2000

(Source: http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12009.html)
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Florida
53,926.82
296.4

Table 2 American Community Survey: Demographic Profile Brevard County
Social Characteristics Average household size
Average family size
Population 25 years and over
High school graduate or higher
Bachelor's degree or higher
Civilian veterans (civilian population 18 years & over)
Speak language other than English at home (5 years and over)
Household population
Economic Characteristics In labor force (population 16 years and over)
Median household income (in 2008 inflation-adjusted dollars)
Median family income (in 2008 inflation-adjusted dollars)
Per capita income (in 2008 inflation-adjusted dollars)
Families below poverty level
Individuals below poverty level
Housing Characteristics Total housing units
Occupied housing units
Owner-occupied housing units
Renter-occupied housing units
Vacant housing units
Owner-occupied homes
Median value (dollars)
ACS Demographic Estimates Total population
Male
Female
Median age (years)
Under 5 years
18 years and over
65 years and over
One race
White
Black or African American
American Indian and Alaska Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander
Some other race
Two or more races
Hispanic or Latino (of any race)

Estimate
2.42
2.98
382,446

75,341
49,590
526,773
259,406
50,080
61,965
27,752

264,429
217,481
167,158
50,323
46,948
167,158
204,800
534,165
262,295
271,870
43.6
27,614
426,151
107,965
523,849
449,926
51,806
1,886
10,878
273
9,080
10,316
36,830

Percent

U.S.
2.61
3.20

90.2
26.0
17.8
9.8

84.5%
27.4%
10.1%
19.6%

58.9

6.7
9.6

65.2%
52,175
63,211
27,466
9.6%
13.2%

82.2
76.9
23.1
17.8

88.0%
67.1%
32.9%
12.0%
192,400

49.1
50.9
5.2
79.8
20.2
98.1
84.2
9.7
0.4
2.0
0.1
1.7
1.9
6.9

49.3%
50.7%
36.7
6.9%
75.5%
12.6%
97.8%
74.3%
12.3%
0.8%
4.4%
0.1%
5.8%
2.2%
15.1%

(Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2008 American Community Survey: http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?
_event=Search&_lang=en&_sse=on&geo_id=05000US12009&_county=Brevard+County)
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11

0

Yes

Yes

Yes, Public Agency employer

50

2

23

18.5

4.5

Yes

Yes

Yes, Public Agency employer

43

3

9

9

0

Yes

No

Yes, Public Agency employer

39

4

12

9

3

Yes

Yes

Yes, Public Agency employer

37

5

12

6.5

Yes

N/A

Yes, Public Agency employer

32

6

13

7.5

Yes

N/A

Yes, Public Agency employer

46

7

11

10.5

No

N/A

Yes, Public Agency employer

62

8

9

9

Yes

N/A

Yes, Public Agency employer

36

9

9

7

2

Yes

No

No, retired

62

10

4.5

1

3.5

Yes

Yes

No, changed professions

51

11

11

11

0

Yes

Yes

No, currently unemployed

18

12

6.5

.5

6

Yes

N/A

Yes, Private Agency employer

47

13

1

1

Yes

N/A

Yes, Public Agency employer

67

14

8

5

No

No

No, changed professions

64

Yes

No

Yes, Private Agency employer

65

3

Total Years Private

Total Years Public

Total Years working in
Family Safety

Respondent #

15*

Master’s Degree in
Related Field

.5

Current Status (Offered
by respondent during
interview process)

11

Bachelor’s Degree in
Related Field

1

*Respondent 15 choose not to grant an interview
Related educational fields: Liberal Arts, Sociology, Psychology, Human Resources, BSW,
Criminal Justice, Education; Unrelated educational fields: Natural Sciences, International
Studies, Public Administration, MBA; N/A: No degree at the master’s level
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Length of Interview

Table 3 Participant Characteristics

Table 4 General Cluster Comparison (variation of Truth Table)
Less Removals
Changes to Policy/Procedure
Proximity Issues
Staffing Issues
Knowledge of Service Providers/Referrals
Being “Called” to the Work
More Computer/Paperwork/Less time in Field
Statistics
Working Together/Morale/Camaraderie
The CARES Program
Communication
Case Plan/Family Team Conferencing
Power Struggles
Change
Lower Caseload
It’s a Business
Benefits/Insurance
Increases to Administrative Personnel

POSITIVES
Less Removals
Lower Caseload
Case Plan/Family Team Conferencing
The CARES Program
NEGATIVES
Changes to Policy/Procedure
Proximity Issues
Staffing Issues
Knowledge of Service Providers/Referrals
More Computer/Paperwork/Less time in Field
Statistics
Working Together/Morale/Camaraderie
Communication
Power Struggles
Change
It’s a Business
Benefits/Insurance
NEITHER POSITIVE NOR NEGATIVE
Being “Called” to the Work
Increases to Administrative Personnel

CPI
1, 13
1, 13
1, 8, 13
1, 8, 13
1, 13
8, 13
8, 13
8
8, 13
8, 13

SERVICES
14
2, 4, 5, 12

5, 6, 9, 10, 12
2, 9
2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12
10
2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 14
5, 6, 12
2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14
2, 12
2, 9, 10, 12, 14
4
5, 10, 12, 14
5, 6, 9
9

ADMIN.

3, 7
7
7
3, 7
3, 7

7

3
CPI

SERVICES

1, 13

14
5, 10, 12, 14
2, 12
5, 6, 12

8, 13
1, 13
1, 8, 13
1, 8, 13
1, 13
8, 13
8
8, 13

8, 13
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ADMIN.

2, 4, 5, 12

5, 6, 9, 10, 12
2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12
10
2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 14
2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14
2, 9, 10, 12, 14
4
5, 6, 9
9
2, 9

3, 7
7
7
3, 7

7

3, 7
3

APPENDIX D: DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
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Interview Schedule Guide/Discussion Questions
We are meeting to talk about your views, feelings and ideas about your job.
Specifically, we will be discussing how you do your job and what differences you have
noted between working for the FDCF and _________________________ (name of
agency).
Participant Background
1. How long have you been employed with ______________________ (name of
agency).
2. How long were you employed by the FDCF?
3. What is your level of education?
4. Have you gone back to school while you have been employed and if so, what
degrees/certifications were you seeking?
Key Questions about the Work
1. How do you define “success” with regard to case closure?
2. Is your concept of success different than your agency’s concept of success?
3. What is different about your job since you have been with _____________ (name of
private agency)? Explain.
4. What do you feel are the three biggest differences between this job and your former
job?
5. Do you believe that ____________ (name of current employer) provides a better
model of care than the FDCF? Explain.
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6. Do you more personally identify with the goals of ________________ (name of
current employer) than you did the goals of the FDCF?
7. Are there specific things that you do differently now which help to make you more
successful in your job?
8. Are there things that you did when you worked for FDCF which you wish you could
incorporate into this job?
9. Are there things that you do now in the field or with paperwork which you consider to
be unneeded?
10. What are some of the constraints that you have now that you didn’t have working for
the FDCF?
11. What are some of the field benefits of working for a smaller agency as opposed to
the FDCF?
12. Do you still feel the presence of the FDCF? How? How often?
13. Do you feel that the new system is more/less responsive than the FDCF?
14. What are the significant changes to how you do your job?

Key Questions about Supervisor Rapport
1. Describe your rapport with your supervisor.
2. Is your supervisor someone you also knew while working at FDCF?
3. How is the employee-supervisor relationship similar or different now than before?
4. Do you feel as if changes you feel in your relationship with your supervisor are
related to the new system?
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5. What recommendations would you have for your supervisor and other “decision
makers” with regard to your job?
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APPENDIX E: ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS: BREVARD FAMILY
PARTNERSHIPS
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